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Part I. Conceptualizing Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights: Dissolving Categories

1

Toward the Institutional Integration of
the Core Human Rights Treaties
CRAIG SCOTT

By its nature as a pronouncement of high normative principles, the Univer
sal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) did not address the hard ques
tions related to the creation of institutions to begin the process of bridging
the gap between statement of ideals and practical realization. However,
stai ting with the grand bifurcation that produced the International Cove
nant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the Inter
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) as the two insti
tutionally separated offspring of the UDHR, the UN human rights treaty
order has evolved in such a way that the UDHR’s inclusion of the entire
range of then-recognized human rights in one authoritative instrument has
become fragmented. We now have six core conventions each with its own
treaty body charged with interpreting and monitoring compliance with its
own instrument.1 This chapter builds on works that seek to make a case for a
much less category-bound approach to thinking about human rights.2 The
theme which unites these works with the present chapter is the need for a
conscious and radical breaking down of the normative boundaries among
the categories framed by each of the human rights treaties and for a comple
mentary “interactive reformation” of the treaties’ institutional orders in
order to harness the benefits achievable through dialogue across diverse
perspectives in the juridical construction of human rights knowledge.
The argument in the first work, “Reaching Beyond,” was that we must
strive to make the original promise of the UDHR —that its human rights
represent an integrated bundle of fundamental interests — the overarching
premise of the current six-treaty order. An analytical shift is required to
enable us to search out ways to approach received categories (economic,
social, and cultural rights, women’s rights, and so on) with a certain wariness
of the aptness of those categories and with an associated willingness to cross
to and fro among categories. We must further be prepared to engage in
category crossing-and category combining —to the point that we begin to
defy the categories themselves by developing our shared sense of when it is
awkward, usually unhelpful, and often even harmful to understand a given
rights claim or context in terms of existing categories. Harm is exacerbated
when we approach a right’s content as involving only a single category of
rights as contained in the one treaty that is subject to interpretation or
application.3
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In the second work, “Bodies of Knowledge,” the context was set by recent
recommendations that consolidation of the six treaty bodies into one or two
bodies should be on the UN reform agenda. It was argued that harnessing of
diversity must be central to any consolidation reforms and that diversity
enhancing initiatives must start immediately with respect to the current sixcommittee order, in part because practical experimentation with promoting
diversity will provide valuable lessons at the institutional design stages of
any eventual consolidation project. But the central thrust of the argument
was that such an approach was independently desirable quite apart from
whether treaty-body consolidation is in the cards. Two premises were — and
remain —central. The first is that superior collective judgment is exercised
when multiple perspectives are encouraged to interact with each other in
coming to grips with any given normative issue or decision. The second is
that, in order for diverse perspectives and actors to interact, there must first
be a commitment to ensuring diversity within the composition of the mem
bership of collective decision-making bodies. Diversity multiplies perspec
tives, while the need for decision making necessitates that those perspectives
engage each other. Diversity helps oust monological reasoning in favor of
dialogical reasoning, making it less likely that reasoning will take place
within the four corners of a single person’s limited knowledge and more
likely that it will take place in the context of the necessity to test one’s
assumptions and intuitions against those of others. The operative good of a
“dialogical universalism” is knowledge and the perspectives that adhere to
knowledge. In somewhat oversimplified terms, we can think of “social expe
rience” and “disciplinary expertise” as the two main forms of knowledge
relevant to the juridical construction of normative knowledge.4
“Bodies of Knowledge” noted but bracketed a third form of diversity of
knowledge in the human rights treaty context which fuses diversities of
expertise and experience, namely, diversity of “normative focus.” This term
was meant to capture the epistemological perspectives that tend to coalesce
around a category of human rights as it gets constructed over time as its own
distinct field of knowledge. In this way, we can speak metaphorically, but
meaningfully, about the potential of treaty texts to enter into dialogues with
one another, dialogues that profit from the interaction of the diverse knowl
edge (s) each treaty regime has constructed for itself. The present chapter
was signaled by the following passage at the end of the introduction in
“Bodies of Knowledge”:
[A] second proposal . . . could complement [the discussion in “Bodies of Knowl
edge”]. This is for the human rights committees, through pragmatic acts of institu
tional co-operation, to consider their six treaties as interconnected parts of a single
human rights “constitution” and thereby to consider themselves as partner cham
bers within a consolidating supervisory institution. Through such acts of pragmatic
imagination, each committee would be encouraged to place itself within a network
of dialogue with the other committees; all would seek to expand their horizons
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through harnessing the pool of diverse knowledge represented by their large collec
tive membership and the diversity of normative mandates of the six treaties.5
The operative assumption of this passage is that, if diversity is seen as an
institutional good because of its role in bringing to bear multiple angles of
vision on the exercise ofjudgment, then it makes sense to look at the treaty
body order as a whole and ask whether knowledge-enhancing effects can be
achieved by reforming the relations of the committees among themselves. It
becomes important to think in terms of the normative focus of each com
mittee’s constitutive treaty as having only a partial perspective on human
rights which would be enhanced by dialogical engagement with the other
committees.6 Such dialogical congress can be organized in terms of at least
two broad patterns of interaction.
If, for some purposes or in some contexts, the committees began to inter
act as a kind of quasi-consolidated committee of the whole, then this would
have the effect not only of increasing the overall membership pool (to 97)
but also of deepening the pool of knowledge. An analysis that is fuller and
normatively richer can —or, can potentially —be achieved than is possible
from within a single committee with its more limited membership and its
more narrowly categorized normative focus. Here, the treaty bodies (or
cross-cutting working groups made up of several members from each treaty
body) would interact as some kind of organic or seamless whole, consoli
dated around a common purpose to the point that the boundaries between
the institutions functionally dissolve, even if only temporarily and for lim
ited purposes. So, for example, if the six human rights committees were to
meet for two days in a joint plenary session to discuss the draft text of a
common general comment on the relationship of social vulnerability to
human rights violations, we would speak of the committees (and their mem
bers) as consolidated for this purpose.7
In other contexts there may not be any actual convening of the members
of the committees into some kind of committee of the whole, but rather a
more notional or virtual dialogue in which each committee takes note of
procedural and substantive developments (some routine and some more
experimental) that have taken place in other committees and then makes
an independent choice as to whether to emulate what is going on in the
other committee(s). On this approach, we would think less in terms of (the
members of) the committees interacting as a single consolidated collectivity
and more in terms of the committees interacting as autonomous bodies with
their own institutional perspectives. Such inter-treaty interaction would be
premised on institutional sovereignty (both ofjurisdiction and of normative
focus) remaining intact in a strong sense. The interaction that takes place is
in the form of dialogue across palpable boundaries in which each institution
seeks either to persuade or to learn from another institution. Each institu
tion has its separate perspective generated by its normative focus and by its
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practical experience which it may wish to commend to the other institu
tion (s) or to have enriched by listening to the other institution’s perspec
tives and experience. Jurisdictionally separate institutions are engaging in
dialogue (as an inter-institutional order), not the membership of the institu
tions as an amalgamated whole (a pan-institutional order).
The first two sections of this chapter discuss various basic possibilities as to
how such institutional integration could evolve in the near future. The final
section then offers some thoughts on what spin-off benefits might be pro
duced by such integration for resituating “economic, social, and cultural
rights” in the process of responding to the next generation of monitoring
challenges in the rapidly evolving context of economic globalization and
transnational reconfigurations in governance structures.

The Role of the Annual Meeting of the Chairpersons in Fostering Evolution
of the Human Rights Treaties’ Integrated Jurisdictional Order
Picturing the Six-Treaty System
A stylized (bordering on caricatured) depiction of the contrast between the
state of the current UN human rights treaty order and the as-yet-unrealized
potential of institutional integration can be found in Figures 1 and 2. In
both diagrams the six treaties are depicted as circles (A-F). Each circle
overlaps with the other circles to varying degrees so as to represent the unity
of purpose and the shared norms of the treaties as well as the potential for
integrated normative analysis to defy the definitional categories of the rights
in each treaty. The combined treaty order is shown as embedded in a larger
UN human rights system that surrounds the treaties in a cocoon of moral,
political, and legal norms. The United Nations Charter and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights are the energy sources for this field. Each
treaty has provisions establishing and setting out the authority of its moni
toring institution. These provisions are represented as smaller circles lo
cated so as to portray each of the six human rights treaty bodies incor
porated within its own treaty’s normative world. It is with respect to the
location of each committee and associated relations with the other commit
tees that Figures 1 and 2 differ.
In Figure 1 (the current treaty order), each committee is shown as lying
outside the field of normative overlap. This is suggestive, to an exaggerated
extent, of the way each committee has tended to treat its treaty as a selfcontained regime relatively unconnected to the other five treaties. Each
committee’s location on the far edge of each treaty is also suggestive of
both its distance from the area of greatest normative overlap (the normative
core of the treaty order) and its isolation from the other committees. Six
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REST OF UN SYSTEM

Universal Declaration
and
UN Charter

A = ICCPR
B = CAT
C = ICESCR
D = CERD
E=CEDAW
F = CRC

Figure 1. The current core treaty order.

much smaller circles in that area of overlap represent the exception to this
Figure 1 state of affairs. These circles represent the chairpersons of the six
committees who, aswill be discussed in upcoming sections, have been inter
acting periodically. Except for the occasional individual committee member
who may use one or more other treaties as some kind of interactive refer
ence point in the interpretation of her or his own treaty, it is only the chair
persons who currently have the opportunity to participate in a structured
pan-institutional context that allows them to view the shared norms of the
treaties as fertile ground which is ready for careful cultivation. In contrast, for
many of the other members of each committee, this same ground is more
likely to be seen as akin to a wild thicket covered in a tangle of branches and
thorns — an area to avoid rather than cultivate.
Figure 2 (the potential treaty order) is the diametric opposite to Figure 1.
Here, interactive diversity of knowledge is harnessed by mapping institu
tional arrangements onto the area of greatest normative synergy among the
treaties. Not only the chairs (periodically) but also the committees (con
stantly) interact in such a way that their combined institutional order takes
on a shifting amorphous shape. The committees are no longer distinct or
distant circles, although the rounded outer curves of this new body are
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REST OF UN SYSTEM

D

Universal Declaration
and
UN Cnarter

A = ICCPR
B = CAT
C = ICESCR
D = CERD
E = CEDAW
F = CRC

Figure 2. Potential (de facto consolidated) core treaty
order.

meant to suggest a certain retention by each committee of considerable
ongoing institutional autonomy and of a certain possibility that a given
committee can always dislodge (or threaten to dislodge) itself from this
consolidated institutional structure if it becomes dissatisfied with how its
treaty mandate has fared as a result of the incorporation.
As of 2000, the actual situation has evolved to some point between Figures
1 and 2. A certain, albeit embryonic, institutional integration of the treaty
bodies has begun to occur. Much of the cooperation is inter-institutional in
nature, taking the form of sharing of information and also of tacit emula
tion, whereby one committee pioneers a procedural innovation and others
begin to follow suit.8 This is of course testimony to the fact thatjurisdictional
diversity combined with jurisdictional autonomy can foster productive ex
perimentation, something that would be severely hampered by total consol
idation of all six existing committees into one committee.9 At least one
committee, CEDAW, has designated committee members to be in charge of
liaising with the other committees, one committee member for each other
treaty.10 However, there are nascent, albeit fitful, signs of the possible emer
gence of an pan-institutional order, to which we now turn.
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The Role of the Annual Meeting of the Chairpersons

The most important form of institutional cooperation among the six hu
man rights treaty bodies is the now annual meeting of the six committee
chairpersons. It may be viewed as a forum pushing to become an institution,
representing a kind of hybrid of the two forms of institutional interaction
described above, the inter-institutional and the pan-institutional. The chair
persons first began meeting in 1984, meeting periodically thereafter until
the institution of yearly meetings in 1994.11 With each subsequent meeting,
the range of other significant actors who attend or make presentations to
the chairpersons has grown,12 to the point that some of the more powerful
NGOs have not only attended but have also been permitted to make oral
presentations to the chairpersons.13 The meeting’s Internet-accessible re
ports to the General Assembly, along with follow-up reports produced by the
UN human rights secretariat in response to recommendations of the pre
vious year’s meeting, provide helpful overviews of recent developments in
the institutional practices of each of the treaty bodies. The chairpersons’
reports, especially those up to the end of 1998, contain many specific recom
mendations directed to all of the committees, mostly recommendations for
procedural reform.14 There are as many, if not more, recommendations
directed to other actors within the system, most notably to the UN human
rights bureaucracy.15 The annual meeting is clearly starting to play a kind of
clearinghouse role whereby developments and suggestions from each com
mittee are conveyed by that committee’s chairperson to the chairpersons of
the other five committees, and then the chairpersons acting as a collectivity
feed the most meritorious and/or timely ones back to the committees by
way of their annual report. The method by which the chairpersons address
the committees varies, taking the form sometimes of simple descriptions of
what various committees are doing and sometimes, more ambitiously, of
joint recommendations. 16
By and large, the chairpersons have concentrated until quite recently
mostly on procedural and resource issues of common interest to the com
mittees and have not tended to use their meetings as an occasion for sub
stantive normative cooperation. On occasion, however, they have taken a
common normative position on matters of substantive law. At least four of
these have related to difficult issues of general treaty law: reservations, suc
cession, denunciation, and interpretively implied powers.
On the question of permissibility and the effects of reservations, solidarity
among the committees was demonstrated by the chairpersons’ support for
the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment 24 on reservations.17
This united front is bound to make it easier for the Human Rights Commit
tee to maintain a strong position on reservations in the face of resistance
from states like the United States, France, and the United Kingdom who
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have submitted critical comments on the HRC’s reasoning in that general
comment.18
On the question of state succession to human rights treaties, the chairper
sons at their fifth meeting, in 1994, “expressed the view that successor States
are automatically bound by obligations under international human rights
instruments from die dates of their independence and that respect of their
obligations should not depend on a declaration of confirmation.”19 A year
later die Human Rights Committee may well have drawn support from this
statement when it took the view in its concluding observations on the report
of die United Kingdom relating to Hong Kong that human rights treaty
obligations devolved with territory such that China would be bound to re
spect the ICCPR after its takeover of Hong Kong.20
On the question of die power to withdraw from human rights treaties, the
chairpersons in September 1997 stated their view that a state party cannot
withdraw from the ICCPR, a response to the announcement only three
weeks earlier by North Korea that it intended to denounce the ICCPR.21
This view was actually stated before the Human Rights Committee itself had
had an opportunity to discuss and then pronounce on the subject, which it
did two montiis later in the form of General Comment 26.22 It is also signifi
cant from the perspective of the gradual evolution of the interpretive au
thority of die Chairpersons diat their collective view on denunciation ap
plies not only to the ICCPR but also to the two other treaties which, like the
ICCPR, do not contain clauses expressly permitting denunciation, namely
the 1CESCR and CEDAW.
Finally, on die question of implied powers, die chairpersons have articu
lated what will probably turn out to be the most significant of their series
of views on general treaty law. The specific issue tiiat the Chairpersons
were considering was, on die surface, the legal jurisdiction of any of the
committees to consider die human rights situation of a state when that state
has failed to submit a state report. Two committees, the CESCR and CERD,
had adopted a practice of considering situations in states whose state report
is long overdue “once all alternative approaches have been exhausted.”23
This is one of die best examples of the benefits of jurisdictional experimentalism within the human rights treaty order in that both the UN Com
mission on Human Rights and die General Assembly had come to endorse
these two committees’ initiative. Despite such high level political support
within the UN, a number of states (and, it seems, some committee mem
bers in other committees) had begun to question whether such an ap
proach “might exceed the legal competence of a committee.”24 This was the
context in which the chairpersons weighed in with tiieir view on whether
each committee could examine the situation of a state in the absence of a
report. The analysis is quite detailed (relative to the usual style found in
die chairpersons’ reports) and, on the whole, leans heavily toward the view
that the practice is within the competence of the committees.25 However,
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the significance of the chairpersons* reasoning lies not in their conclu
sion on the specific interpretive issue (examining states who have not re
ported) but rather in the general statement of the principles of interpre
tation that should be applied to resolve claims to implied jurisdictional
powers made by the treaty bodies. The chairpersons’ reasoning is poten
tially transformative in that not only does it lay the basis for the evolution
of the jurisdictional powers of each committee, but also it points to the
legal basis on which a pan-treaty “constitutional” order could itself institu
tionally evolve:
The principle which should ... be applied in responding to a situation which
threatened to undermine the entire system for supervising the obligations freely
undertaken by States Parties by virtue of their ratification or accession to the relevant
treaty was that of ensuring the effectiveness of the regime established by the treaty.
In the absence of any provision to the contrary in a treaty, the question was whether
or not a particular course of action contributed to the effectiveness of that regime.
That approach was analogous to the principle of implied powers, according to which
the acceptability of activities not explicitly provided for should be determined in
light of the object and purpose of the treaty in question. The International Court of
Justice has also noted that, even in the absence of specific enabling powers, an
international body may act in ways not specifically forbidden, in order to achieve its
purposes and objectives.26

As a legal theory of the interpretive acquisition ofjurisdictional powers, the
above-stated principles will not take root in a vacuum. Parallel processes of
political recognition of any powers the committees claim for themselves will
operate in tandem with the more forensic processes of interpretation that
produce the claims. Yet, in this one tight paragraph, it may not be an exag
geration to say that the chairpersons have sown the seeds for the institu
tional evolution of an integrated human rights treaty order.

From Structure to Substance: Fostering Integrated
Normative Analysis

The just-given examples dealing with the intersection of general treaty law
and the evolution of the human rights committees’ jurisdictional compe
tence constitute very significant examples of cross-committee coordination.
However, with respect to matters of substantive content of human rights
guarantees (as opposed to structural treaty law issues), the chairpersons’
contribution has, to date, been considerably less far-reaching. The area of
“integration of gender perspectives ” represents, so far, the major substan
tive foray of the chairpersons, being the subject of detailed recommenda
tions by the chairpersons in 1995, repeated in 1996 and embellished in
1997. In 1995, the chairpersons endorsed the output of an expert group
meeting on women’s rights, including that meeting’s lead recommenda
tion, which read as follows:
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The treaty bodies shall fully integrate gender perspectives into their presessional and
sessional working methods, including identification of issues and preparation of
questions for country renews, general comments, general recommendations, and
concluding observations. In particular, the treaty bodies should consider the gender
implications of each issue discussed under each of the articles of the respective
instruments.27
The endorsement in the 1995 chairpersons’ report seemed to produce
some effects within both the conventional human rights order and the
nonconventional order.28 In 1996 the UN Commission on Human Rights
adopted a resolution welcoming the chairpersons’ recommendation and
went on itself to recommend to all the treaty bodies that their reporting
guidelines should be amended to reflect a greater emphasis on gender
specific information.29 During their separate sessions that same year, three
committees —the CESCR, CERD, and CRC —signaled that gender perspec
tives would be a central feature in contemplated revisions of their existing
reporting guidelines for state reports.30 One committee, the Human Rights
Committee, announced that it would revise its general comment on article 3
of die ICCPR which deals with discrimination against women.31 Finally, the
secretariat for CEDAW, the Division for the Advancement of Women, “be
gan to develop a methodology by which die treaty bodies might systemati
cally and routinely incorporate a gender perspective in monitoring die
implementation of the specific provisions contained in the international
human rights instruments.”32 Prior to the chairpersons’ 1997 meeting, the
secretariat’s follow-up report to the 1996 meeting took its cue from the
chairpersons to assert that “die equal enjoyment by men and women of all
human rights is an overarching principle of the six principal human rights
treaties" and to suggest that the chairpersons “may wish to consider inviting
an interested organization to convene a round-table or expert meeting to
assist with the drafting of general comments on gender equality.”33 At their
ensuing meeting, the chairpersons discussed whether another expert meet
ing such as the one whose conclusions the chairpersons adopted in 1995
and 1996 was desirable. The result of their discussion was an invitation to
“the relevant United Nations agencies and secretariats to consider the orga
nization of another such meeting.”34 Meanwhile, another roundtable had
already taken place in the preceding year, organized by the United Nations
Population Fund (UNFPA) on the theme of human rights approaches to
women’s health. The chairpersons used this roundtable as a springboard for
recommending both that “a gender dimension be incorporated in the revi
sion [by each committee] of general comments/recommendations and
[state reporting] guidelines” and that the treaty bodies “consider issuing
general recommendations on health.”35 While the chairpersons drew spe
cial attention to sexual and reproductive health, their recommendation that
health (in general) could be the subject of general comments by all the

i
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committees is an important addition to gender as a cross-cutting normative
dimension of all six human rights treaties.36

The Chairpersons as a Coordinating and Catalyzing Body
It would seem apparent enough that the meeting of the chairpersons is
slowly developing and pushing for a role as the coordinating, and to some
extent catalyzing, mechanism for the institutional integration of relations
among the committees. A good example of the chairpersons serving as
institutional catalyst, in a way that combines attention to common substan
tive concerns and the development of its implied jurisdiction, is the follow
ing 1995 recommendation regarding the need for a pan-treaty approach to
responding to gross violations of human rights:
The chairpersons encourage treaty bodies to continue their efforts to develop mech
anisms for the prevention of gross human rights violations, including early warning
and urgent procedures. They consider that coordinated action by the human rights
treaty bodies in this regard would increase their effectiveness. To this end, they
suggest that any action undertaken by one of the treaty bodies be immediately
brought to the attention of the other treaty bodies.37

With respect to some of the suggestions (see below) on how consolidation
might proceed so as to enhance a diversity-based dialogue, it would seem
desirable that the chairpersons act as the institutional hub of the process of
consolidation in tandem with whatever political support from the UN politi
cal bodies and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights seems appro
priate or necessary to secure. The chairpersons have themselves spoken of
their role in terms that hint at this function. In the context of discussing
reform of the UN human rights treaty system, they spoke of the need to take
advantage of “opportunities to promote continuing reform of the working
methods of the different committees,” ending with the following succinct
observation about their own role: “The chairpersons believed that, meeting
together, they could play a part in the process of reform. While ensuring
that proper account was always taken of the features specific to each of the
six treaty bodies, they could identify problems common to different treaty
bodies and help them coordinate their responses. ”38
Such a relatively minimal role for the chairpersons is consistent with what
appears to be, at present, a lack of support for de jure consolidation of the
treaty bodies into one committee.39 It is also consistent with the kind of
process of institutional integration that amounts to a gradual, experimental
de facto quasi-consolidation — the subject of this chapter.
Related to the development of the chairpersons’ capacity to serve as an
institutional hub for the human rights treaties is the chairpersons’ repeated
recommendation, beginning with their 1994 report, to the General Assem-
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bly that some “sui generis status” be established for the treaty bodies so that
the bodies could interact with the rest of the UN system in a more official
capacity.40 Although this request seems primarily intended to allow each
treaty body to act independently under the mantle of such status, it would
seem just as important from the perspective of integrated institutionalism
for the treaty bodies as a collective whole, represented by the chairpersons,
to be recognized as having a functional status. Given that it is the meeting of
the chairpersons that has begun to take up cudgels on behalf of the treaty
bodies as a whole, some recognition needs to be accorded to their meeting
as the primary agent in the external relations of the committees.41 By creat
ing this role in external relations, a dynamic toward enhancing internal
cooperation and normative cohesion would thereby also be created. To
accomplish this goal, however, some attention arguably needs to be paid to
the politics of language. In that regard, the purpose of the next two para
graphs in this subsection is to advance the rather impertinent suggestion
that we should consider alternative ways in which to refer to the annual
meeting of the chairpersons. This question of the title for the chairpersons’
collective must first be situated in the context of the disparity in the official
titles as between five of the six treaty bodies and one of them.
This chapter has been using the terms “human rights treaty bodies” and
“human rights committees” interchangeably. This is deliberate, motivated
by a conviction that a politics of language is an important way to help dis
lodge systemic biases.42 This concern extends to the subliminal associations
generated by institutional appropriation of the term “human rights.”43 In
particular, it has long been a problem that the treaty body overseeing the
ICCPR was vested by that treaty with the name “Human Rights Committee”
while each of the other committees have been given names that simply track
the focus in their treaty’s title on the set of rights found in that treaty— the
“Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,” the “Committee
Against Torture” and so on.44 There is thus good cause for certain symbolic
acts in the realm of language that would try to counteract this linguistic
covering of the field by the Human Rights Committee. One option would be
to convey to the world at large that, within the current (undesirable) frag
mented logic of the multiple treaty system, the “Human Rights Committee”
is actually the “Civil and Political Rights Committee.” In this somewhat
subversive way, we would thereby be trying to encourage a practice of refer
ring to the six human rights committees in terms that suggest the unity of
purpose of the six treaties taken as a systemic whole and their shared claim to
be the institutional guardians of human rights. In so doing, the under
inclusiveness of the Human Rights Committee’s own “civil and political
rights” mandate in relation to its imperial name (at least that mandate as
the Human Rights Committee currently interprets it) would be perceived
more clearly.45
In a similar vein, it is worth noting that the politics of language —
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UN-style — seems to have resulted so far in a second class, “lower case” status
for the chairpersons’ forum. Reports to the General Assembly, the agendas
that precede the meetings, and other documents currently refer simply to
“the persons chairing the human rights treaty bodies.” In view of this prac
tice, the chairpersons might wish to consider pushing the linguistic enve
lope a bit by referring to themselves in a more symbolically assertive way. At
minimum, the annual meeting could be self-styled in capitals as the “Annual
Meeting of the Chairpersons of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies,” which
ever case the UN bureaucracy chooses to use. An even bolder styling could
be “Annual Meeting of the Chairpersons of the Human Rights Commit
tees.” Perhaps the most radical, but mostjustified, de facto reform would be
for each committee to give its blessing to constituting —linguistically —an
overarching body, the name of which would convey the dual idea of inte
grated normative mandate and cooperative institutional action. Once con
stituted by collective recognition of the six treaty bodies, the chairpersons
could then begin to seek (implicit and eventually explicit) general recogni
tion by states and the rest of the UN system. The chairpersons’ forum (en
compassing its annual meeting and its inter-meeting activities) could in this
way metamorphose into something like the “Coordinating Council of the
Human Rights Committees” or the “Council of Chairpersons of the Human
Rights Committees” — on either score, the CCHRC.
All this being said, there are reasons to be pessimistic about the likelihood
that the chairpersons will evolve to any great extent in this direction without
a change in outlook in several quarters. Quite apart from the lack of enthusi
asm of some of the chairpersons, any move toward consolidation in the near
future is likely to be politically resisted, for reasons that include the opposi
tion of some states to the promotion of more effective UN human rights
structures as well as legalistic concerns about treating the six treaties as an
“objective” legal order (even an evolving one) in a situation where some
states have ratified fewer than all six treaties. In this respect, it is worth
noting that, while the Commission on Human Rights did respond favorably
to the chairpersons’ recommendation on cross-treaty integration of gender
perspectives, it also added the caveat that “the enjoyment of the human
rights of women should be closely monitored by each treaty body within the
competence of its mandate.”** This passage can easily be read as a shot across
the bows of the committees.47
But pessimism is not fate. Despite the rather sober thoughts in the preced
ing paragraph, what follows will assume that the chairpersons can come to
assume a role as the hub of institutional reform of the treaty body order. The
following proposals, then, assume the proactive involvement of the chair
persons. In tandem with the evolution of the chairpersons as a coordinating
and catalyzing institution, a number of avenues of intercommittee dialogical
engagement will begin to open up. The following brief discussions of some
of the more obvious possible initiatives should not be taken as anything but a
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preliminary endorsement of die merits of any given possibility. Most significantly, die merits of one proposal cannot be assessed in isolation from the
other proposals. No claim is being made, at this stage, of the degree of
compatibility inter se of the various proposals. The purpose of what follows is
merely to put them on the table as candidates for consideration.

Pan-Institutional Dialogue: Further Basic Experiments in
Institutional Design

Pushing

for

Universal Ratification as a Complementary Reform

A central recommendation of a 1997 report to the UN on enhancing the
long-term effectiveness of die UN human rights treaty system is that the goal
of achieving universal ratification of all six core treaties should be pursued
with renewed seriousness and vigor.48 In this respect, the report was follow
ing up on an earlier recommendation in a 1993 report to make the advent of
the millennium the target date for universal ratification.49 The chairpersons
have also been vigorous in endorsing die need for treating universal ratifica
tion as a priority for die future treaty system, most recentiy having referred
to universal ratification of the six treaties as “an essential dimension of a
global order.”50 This phrasing suggests some awareness that a fully “objec
tive” legal order, which as such would be able to lay claim to a status in the
world normative order akin to a constitution, is in constant tension with
each slate’s consent to be bound as the prevailing formal basis for the
assumption of treaty obligations qua treaty obligations.
From the perspective of de facto quasi-consolidation of the human rights
treaties as a testing ground for a possible formal consolidation of the com
mittees, universal ratification is important, although probably not indis
pensable. It is important because the closer we get to universal ratification of
all six core treaties, the more easily we can treat the treaties as if they were
different chapters of the same overall constitutional document and the dif
ferent human rights committees as if they were chambers of one overall Hu
man Rights Committee.51 Most significandy from the perspective of cross
treaty dialogue and cooperation among the committees, any perceived
problems of formal jurisdictional divisions become less significant in direct
proportion to the decrease in the number of states who are not party to all
six treaties.52 At the same time, this evolving unity would be achieved while
still retaining both the interactive diversity of knowledge of the six commit
tees’ combined membership pool and the ever-present possibility that one
or more committees can hold out (more or less explicitiy) noncooperation
as a way to ensure their treaty’s normative focus is taken seriously in the pan
treaty constitutional order.53
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Tailored State Reports

Perhaps the best example of a reform that commends itself on the basis of
both efficiency and effectiveness — but which could cut both ways in terms of
diversity —would be the consolidation of the current scheme of sending
separate reports to each committee into a scheme centered on a single
consolidated report that would address all six treaties and would go to all
the committees.54 A related issue is the proposal that, while a state’s first
report to any given committee should be comprehensive, its subsequent
periodic reports to that committee could be made more focused by having
the committee in question signal well in advance (of the reporting dead
line) those areas and concerns it wishes to have covered in the state’s re
port.55 It is not difficult to see how the two proposals could converge into a
single report every five years which would be both consolidated and tailored
and which could be subject to follow-up scrutiny at the instance of any one
of the committees in the intervening five years before the next report is due.
Consolidation and tailoring have been discussed in some detail in the last
several sessions of the chairpersons. The current position seems to be one
that is not (at least, not yet) in favor of consolidation but that is in favor of
tailoring of periodic reports.56 At the September 1998 meeting, the chair
persons expressed their collective view in the following terms:

30. Following the discussion of recent experiences of the respective committees,
the chairpersons reiterated their view that it was desirable to strive towards focused
periodic reports, adding that account must be taken of the limited scope of the issues
covered by some of the treaties.
31. With regard to the frequently expressed idea of consolidating reports in a
single global report covering all six human rights treaties, no consensus could be
reached. As at the eighth meeting, although the chairpersons considered that such
an approach would reduce the number of different reports requested of States
parties and would serve to underline the indivisibility of human rights by ensuring a
comprehensive analysis of the situation, concerns were expressed in relation to
problems resulting from different periodicities of reporting under the treaties and,
in particular, the risk that the special attention given to groups such as women and
children would be lost in a single comprehensive report.57
The consolidated report issue is a prime example of the need for reforms
to be looked at as a whole so as to ensure that they proceed apace. Adjust
ments to one reform proposal can provide the necessary correctives to dis
advantages feared for another. Reporting periodicity is a technical problem
that, with time, can be easily dealt with. Threats to diversity of focus present
a more serious concern.58 In the absence of confidence in the other tracks
of institutional reform, it is reasonable to oppose a single consolidated re
port in favor of ongoing separate reports to each committee. However, the
more that institutional integration succeeds in showing that integration not
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only can but does produce enhancement of normative analysis (that in
cludes bringing the human rights perspectives of less powerful social groups
to the center of that analysis) and does not produce the feared (re) marginal
ization of issues dealing wi th children, racial discrimination, gender discrim
ination, and social and economic disadvantage, the more compelling will be
come the argument for a consolidated pan-treaty report. The achievement
of a sustained diversity of experience and expertise within the combined
membership of the six committees will be absolutely crucial for such success
to be achieved. Also, tailoring of reports could have positive follow-on effects
for consolidation; if the committees were collectively to build in principles
and procedures designed to ensure nonmarginalization, die kinds of issues
on which the committees choose to request focused reporting could allevi
ate concerns that women’s rights or the rights of the poor, for instance, will
necessarily be swamped if the tailored reports also become consolidated into
a single report. In this respect, in the way they handle the development of
tailored reports, the committees are in control of their own destiny with
respect to the inability and desirability of report consolidation.
There is, however, a middle ground possibility that the committees and
their chairpersons may wish to consider, perhaps on an experimental basis
with a number of willing states. As reflected in the above-quoted conclusions
of the chairpersons, it is assumed that tailoring would occur only for periodic
reports, those subsequent to the initial postratification report of a state
party. That initial report would be comprehensive. As for consolidation, the
chairpersons seem implicitly to be talking about all reports, initial and peri
odic. However, conceivably, die proposal for consolidated reports could be
refined (or clarified) into a proposal that only periodic reports be consoli
dated. In this way, each committee would receive a comprehensive first report
on compliance with its treaty. This approach has the significant benefit of
allowing the committee in question (e.g., CEDAW) to develop, as fully as
possible, a view of the general situation in each state party with respect to all
the rights in its treaty. Such a view would be invaluable in providing a major
component of the knowledge base on which that committee can then draw
in the future when considering what tailored questions it wishes to put to
that state on its consolidated subsequent report(s) to the committees as a
whole. A nonconsolidated, nontailored initial report would give each com
mittee a valuable opportunity to prepare the ground for subsequent more
focused evaluation of compliance of tiiat state party with die committee’s
treaty within the larger framework of that state’s consolidated, tailored peri
odic report. Producing a comprehensive initial report for each treaty also
has educational benefits for that state. Not only will its officials have to
grapple with the full range of its commitments under each treaty but also
they will be given die chance to determine for themselves, based on the com
mittee’s questions and concluding observations, the areas in which there is a
high likelihood that the committee will wish to focus its scrutiny in future.
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Overlapping and Common Meetings of the Treaty Bodies
It seems obvious that placing the committees in closer proximity would
assist any efforts at pan-treaty normative dialogue. This means giving consid
eration to scheduling their meetings in ways that overlap in whole or in
part.59 This seems to already be on the agenda in view of a suggestion
contained in the 1997 follow-up report (to the 1996 chairpersons’ meeting)
written by the (then) Centre for Human Rights:

In order to enhance awareness of the work of complementary treaty bodies, it may be
appropriate to reschedule committee sessions so that some of their meetings overlap,
for example, the Human Rights Committee with the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights; die Human Rights Committee with the Committee against
Torture; and the Committee on the Rights of the Child with both the Human Rights
Committee and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.00
It is important to inject a note of caution with respect to the above phrasing
by the chairpersons. Every committee has some complementary relationship
with every oZ/z^rcommittee and, just as importantly, it is impossible to say in ad
vance of actual dialogue the nature or extent of such complementarity. In or
der to facilitate institutional dialogue, the ideal is that a way eventually be
found for an overlap of the meetings of all six treaty bodies for at least part of
one session a year. Furthermore, as is implicit in the subsections which follow,
an overlap of meeting times should be scheduled not simply in order to facili
tate parallel meetings but also in order to make possible common meetings.
Collaborative Normative Pronouncements:
General Comments and “Joint Statements”

One obvious objective of cooperation among some or all of the committees
could be the preparation of general comments that benefit from dialogue
among the committees. In terms of normative elaboration of the content of
rights that would especially benefit from diversity of perspective, there are
any number of thematic comments that one could envisage, such as the
example given earlier of a hypothetical general comment on the relation
ship of social vulnerability to human rights protections. The issue of gender
is already on the agenda. Presumably, each committee other than CEDAW
could draft or revise separate general comments on this issue as it pertains
to its understanding of the rights in its treaty. Or, some overarching general
comment could be drafted cooperatively by the six committees with each
committee then having the option to supplement it with a more detailed
comment that applies, as it were, the common general comment to the
specifics of its treaty.61
Here again the chairpersons have turned their attention to collaborative
pronouncements. In September 1998 they had the following to say:
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General comments and the possible use ofjoint statements
34. The chairpersons took note of the fact that some committees were beginning
to make reference to the general comments or equivalent statements of other com
mittees. They encouraged the development of that practice, insofar as the pro
nouncements of other committees appeared to be relevant and appropriate to the
situation at hand....
36. It was agreed that a new genre of “joint statements” would be an appropriate
means by which to enable the committees to address issues of common concern with
out taking such matters to the level of general comments, in relation to which joint
approaches would always be difficult to achieve. Such joint statements would enable
different treaty bodies to work together to address issues of current importance.62
Only time will tell whether “joint statements” become general comments by
another name or whether they will have a normative status dial is not at the
same “level” as general comments.
Whatever they are called, the advent of collective committee pronounce
ments is a significant and welcome development from the perspective of
normative and institutional integration of the treaty orders. Here it is im
portant to note that the chairpersons’ decision to foster “joint statements”
was a direct consequence of a concrete proposal put forward at the meeting
by the CEDAW Chairperson, Salma Khan, on behalf of her committee. The
proposal was for three committees —CEDAW, along with the HRC and the
CESCR — to “consider issuing a joint statement on the indivisibility of rights
and the centrality of gender awareness as part of the fiftieth anniversary
celebration of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”63 Apart from
endorsing the general concept of “joint statements,” the chairpersons wel
comed this specific initiative: “The chairpersons requested the Division for
the Advancement of Women to prepare a draft to be considered by the three
chairpersons concerned and then to be put to the respective committees.”64
Given its theme, it is not immediately apparent why this first joint state
ment, was limited to three of the six committees. Possibly, a strategic deci
sion was made to start conservatively and try to secure cooperation on a
smaller scale rather than encounter logistical difficulties by involving all
six chairpersons. Such coordination difficulties could easily occur given
that an efficient system of intercommittee coordination is not yet in place.
These problems should not be underestimated. When die chairperson of
the CESCR took the joint statement, as it had been drafted by the chair
person of CEDAW (and, presumably, found satisfactory by the other two
chairpersons), to his own committee for its consideration, three CESCR
committee members made useful comments about how to improve die joint
statement.65 Given that the committees meet at different times of the year,
and given that improvements could be suggested by members of all three
committees, the potential for much delay (and time and energy on die part
of the diree chairpersons) in coordinating the final statement, agreeable to
all diree committees, is considerable. The CESCR handled die matter with
considerable institutional magnanimity by, in effect, delegating authority to
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their chairperson to produce a final joint comment in consultation with the
other two chairpersons that would “duly take into account” their views.66
The final joint statement, as it appears in the official CESCR records for that
same session, contains one change from the draft joint statement, namely
the insertion of a paragraph that seems to represent incorporation of the
comments which had been made by CESCR member Philippe Texier.67
Mention should finally be made of a positive side to having limited the
joint statement to a subset of the committees, namely that it signals the pos
sible flexible use of the joint statement in the future. For example, the HRC,
CAT, and CERD could join in one that seems particularly relevant to their
combined mandates, such as disproportionate police detention of racialized groups in some countries, leading to a higher risk of torture. While it
would be undesirable in the long term for themes (such as indivisibility and
gender awareness) that profoundly involve the mandates of all six commit
tees to be addressed in a joint statement by fewer than all six, the flexibility
to proceed only with a subset of committees would seem to provide useful
room for maneuver and experimentation in a transitional period.

Coordinated Scrutiny of State Reports

Consideration could be given to cooperative scrutiny of state reports, or at
least of those aspects of the report with respect to which the committees can
see (or come to see) much overlap and thus many benefits flowing from a
diversity of committee perspectives. If a given state is due to report to one
committee at roughly the same time as it is reporting to another (for exam
ple, Canada reporting to the CESCR and to the HRC within a year of each
other), the respective committee members in charge of that report could be
asked to consult and to coordinate questions to be asked of the state?68
Common questions could be posed on shared concerns.69
If scheduling permits, one committee’s member who is responsible for a
given state can sit in on the report to the other committee and then take that
session into account in preparing for the second report. At minimum, she
or he can consult the summary records and concluding observations as well
as discuss with the other committee’s member what the second committee
could most usefully focus on in its dialogue with the state.70 If reporting can
be coordinated enough to allow a state to be reporting to two committees at
a time when both committees are meeting in parallel sessions, a decision
could be made to have the two committees sit in a joint session for the
relevant parts of the report or indeed for the entire report.71 It is obvious
enough that this proposal would be most suitable with respect to states who
have decided (or been asked as part of an experimental pilot) to submit
consolidated reports, especially if the practice of tailored reports is also
adopted for such reports. This would combine the benefits ofjoint scrutiny
with efficiencies produced by the time savings which focused reports should
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produce as compared to comprehensive reports. Many of the areas of focus
for a single tailored report could reflect advance consultation among all the
committees to whom the state is reporting.
Standing Cross-Treaty Thematic Working Groups

Standing working groups could be set up with a variety of possible tasks, for
example, to help foster dialogue on general comments which committees
are considering adopting and on joint statements. One could also envisage
other kinds of cross-treaty working gr oups that would be specifically set
up to discuss and propose committee action on cross-cutting normative
issues. With the proper support from the Office of the UN High Commis
sioner for Human Rights and training of committee members, these groups
could easily be organized using virtual forms of communication, for in
stance through Internet website discussion boards or, if not all members
have access to the Internet, through e-mail listservs. If it were felt that it
would be useful to reflect on die health rights of girl children, for example,
a working group could discuss diis theme, acting as a kind of think tank for
the committees as a whole. If a common period of meeting time for the six
committees were scheduled and dedicated for intercommittee work and
reflection, diese working groups could sometimes meet in person in order
to pursue discussions, draft proposals that would go to the respective com
mittees, and produce integrated texts (reports, joint statements, and so on)
once all committees have made their input.
Overlapping Membership
One of the most direct ways to foster an inter-treaty dynamic would be to
create a situation whereby a number of committee members are elected to
more than one committee. One treaty, CAT, already expressly provides for
the desirability of crossover membership as a consideration for election to
its committee.72 There should, accordingly, be no legal problem with over
lapping membership on a wider scale within the human rights treaty system
given that the express provision in CAT for shared membership with the
Human Rights Committee was not viewed as third-party regulation of the
ICCPR. All that would be required would be for states themselves to cre
ate overlap through their nomination and voting practice.73 Each member
elected to more than one committee would be a member of each.
There are any number of reasons why overlapping membership would be
fruitful from the perspective of inter-treaty dialogue. The basic point would
be that overlapping membership would to some extent ensure that human
rights issues are examined by each committee from a broader perspective
than tends to be the case when the sole mandate of every committee mem
ber is one treaty text. One could contemplate any number of axes. For
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example, a person who is a member of both CERD and CEDAW should be
institutionally disposed to inject intersectional issues of race and gender
into the deliberations of each committee.
Such shared committee members would in many ways be encouraged to
act in a fashion that is a classic example of Georges Seelie’s dedoublement
fonclionnelor “double functioning.”74 Scelle’s notion was meant to describe
international lawyers, notably legal advisers to states, who have to be nor
matively faithful both to domestic law and international law, both to the
national interest and to the common international interest. In the process,
the person who must function in such a double capacity not only becomes
skilled at translating one system of legal thought and practice into the terms
of the other, but also becomes skilled at mediating the two systems in ways
that produce an integrated perspective different from, while still faithful to,
both. In the same way, a member of two (or more) human rights committees
would have dual (or multiple) normative loyalties which would have to be
translated and mediated. In this way, the committee members in question
would come to embody a dialogue of treaty texts and the associated norma
tive mandates of those texts.
In relation to the consolidation process, should it ever be desired, a grad
ual increase in overlapping membership could serve a second function. It
could become the primary mechanism whereby de facto consolidation of
the six treaty bodies takes place without the need for any formal treaty
amendments. By the end of the process, if perfectly coordinated by states in
electing the committees (admittedly a remote possibility without a parallel
understanding being reached among states that would solve the collective
action problems), the total number of committee members would be re
duced from the current 97 to 23, which is the number of members on the
largest committee (CEDAW). All 10 members of the smallest two commit
tees, CAT and the CRC, would also be members of all five other committees.
As for the remaining three committees comprised of 18 members each,
there would be a buffer of five CEDAW members (23 minus 18) which would
allow some members of the HRC, CESCR, and CERD not to be members of
one or more of the other three committees and/or allow some members of
CEDAW (statistically, up to five) to be members only of CEDAW.

Benefits of Interactive Integration in Relation to the
Next Generation of Monitoring Challenges

The foregoing institutional reform suggestions have been schematic. They
also probably fall toward the least creative end of a continuum of reform
possibilities, but, for that reason, they also represent practical possibilities.
In the various reform studies underway at the UN, these and kindred pro
posals can presumably be scrutinized with a view to assessing their feasibility
as well as elaborating them and sharpening their focus.
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What remains to be clone in this chapter is to provide a series of concrete
examples of how the gradual enhancement of interactive diversity of knowl
edge through institutional integration of the human rights committees can
contribute to the perceptive analysis of the types of human rights problems
which the UN human rights order must begin— soon — to get its collective
mind around. The following examples are purely illustrative and are vir
tually randomly chosen. No claim is being made that they represent all the
types of next-generation challenges posed for international human rights
monitoring, although an effort has been made to identify the key ones.
Structural Scrutiny and Preventive Remedies

An inevitable feature of the monitoring methods of the treaty bodies has
been their reactive nature. That is to say, they by and large look at what
has already transpired and pass judgment on whether noncompliance with
treaty norms has taken place. However, the state report procedure does —
increasingly —have a forward-looking element to the extent that the com
mittees offer recommendations about how structural failures can be rem
edied. With each passing year, such structural-reform recommendations
become more clearly and incisively formulated, at least by several of the
committees (notably the CESCR, CRC, and CEDAW). Another way, then, of
looking at such structural assessments of past conduct is in terms of their
potentially far-reaching preventive function: if carried out, future human
rights violations should be avoided. Ideally, the committees must begin to
address more directly that aspect of state responsibility which requires states
notjust to prevent specific harms (notably harms of some nonstate actors by
other nonstate actors) that are reasonably foreseeable, but also to organize
the entire apparatus of government in such a way that human rights viola
tions are approached as something to avoid and not simply something to
repair.75
Structural scrutiny and associated preventive remedies involve far-reach
ing inquiries into the interconnectedness of causes and obstacles. Often
enough, no small degree of complexity is involved. As such, the benefits of
more integrated normative analysis facilitated by interactive institutionalism
among the human rights committees would seem obvious. To illustrate this
claim, consider that treaty which most people would, at first blush, see as
benefiting the least from a quasi-consolidation of the treaty order due to its
seemingly narrow focus: the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Yet a Com
mittee Against Torture that focused only or almost exclusively on what goes
on within jail cells and (para) military torture chambers would be missing
much that is relevant to torture prevention, even if sophisticated procedural
safeguards and mechanisms are necessary ways to prevent torture from oc
curring in these locales. Here I am assuming that the will to torture is inti
mately connected to the human capacity to dehumanize and to power struc-
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Hires that nurture and actively exploit this capacity, 'fake race: how does
racism interact with creation and mobilization of the will to torture? Just
asking this question is enough to point out how an interface between GAT
and CERD should deepen understanding of the “ot boring” conditions that
promote torture.76 It would be a two-way street if (XT were to use its con
crete focus to produce analyses of how structures of racial and ethnic preju
dice fuel torture; CERD could then work with these concrete insights in
order to assist, in some dialectical manner, its understanding of the larger
phenomena that produce the conditions for racial discrimination. Similar
interactive advantages could emerge from CESCR-CAT cooperation to the
extent that the poor may be hypothesized to be the most vulnerable to
certain kinds of torture (notably the “casual” police beating) and to recruit
ment as the frontline instruments of torture. And when it comes to rape in
the context of genocide or ethnocide, CAT and CERD would be less likely to
see the gendered dimensions as clearly as they might if CEDAW’s perspec
tives were actively in play (rape as torture and rape-torture as an instrument
of genocide). And, beyond these examples, the whole question of the struc
tural dimensions of torture and the preventive measures necessary to modify
those structures intimately involves perhaps the most structure-influencing
of all human rights: the right to education. As phrased in international hu
man rights instruments, the right to education is nonneutral regarding hu
man rights values.77 CAT analysis which does not explore education’s links to
torture would be inadequate from a structural-preventive perspective.78

Systemically Implied Rights Protections
It is generally not controversial that rights may be implied even if not ex
pressly provided for in a text. For example, as noted earlier, the Human
Rights Committee has implied rights related to health and housing into the
ICCPR “right to life.”79 Another example is of the European Court of Hu
man Rights reading a (conditional) right to civil legal aid into the right to a
fair trial.80 A full list of existing doctrinal examples would be quite long.
However, the tendency is to conceive of the process of implication in
terms of a given contended-for right. For example, when in Johnston it Ire
land the applicants claimed (unsuccessfully) that the tight to divorce was
protected by the European Convention on I Inman Kights, they relied on a
series of specific articles in turn: article4 12 (the tight to marry), article 8 (the
right to family life), and article 14 (the right to nondiscrimination in rela
tion to other protected rights)?1 They did not rely on al! three lights in
combination to argue for the implied right. Or, if they did argue in this
more holistic way, the court did not iindct stand their argument in this way.
Rather, the court examined each article in turn, slat ting with article I2’s
right to marry.
An alternative way Io proc eed when assessing whether a t ight should or
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should not be implied into a treaty is to look at the issue in terms of the
treaty as a whole being the normative touchstone rather than the specific
rights in seriatim. The UN Charter provides an interesting analogy. The
peacekeeping powers of the General Assembly have often been treated less
as having been implied into powers already set out in chapter 4 of the
Charter and more as having been imagined as an entirely new chapter
located between chapters 6 and 7 —“chapter 614.” That is, they have been
systemically implied on the basis of the over-all scheme and purposes of the
Charter. On such an approach, implied rights may be found not only in
given rights but also between given rights and in the combined interstitial zones
of the entire treaty understood as a system of values and interests.82
An example of when such an argument has been employed may help. In
the case of Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), decided
in July 1999 by the Supreme Court of Canada, one issue was whether the
Convention on the Rights of the Child protects a child’s right not to have
the child’s parent deported from the child’s state of nationality.83 No provi
sion in die CRC sets out such a right in explicit terms, but two provisions
surround the contended-for right. The key provisions within articles 9 and
10 read as follows:

Article 9
1. States Parlies shall ensure that a child not be separated from his or her parents
against their will, except when competent authorities subject to judicial review deter
mine, in accordance with applicable law and procedures, that such separation is
necessary for the best interests of the child....
Article 10
1. In accordance with the obligation of States Parties under article 9, paragraph 1,
applications by a child or his or her parents to enter or leave a State Party for the
purpose of family reunification shall be dealt with by States Parties in a positive,
humane and expeditious manner....
To say that these provisions “surround” the right not to have parents de
ported is to say that neither one of them on its own was completely adequate
to the task of serving as die basis of the implied right (a child’s right that her
or his best interests be given great weight in deciding whether a parent may
be deported) that was being argued for. It is with this difficulty in mind that
one intervenor in Baker, the Charter Committee on Poverty Issues (CCPI),
argued that, while neither article 9 nor article 10 is fully apposite when
looked at individually, dieir combined effect is a different story —especially
when article 3 of the treaty is taken into account.84 At one point, the CCPI
factum refers to the oblique approach adopted by the CRC, as part of CCPI’s
attempt to interpretively combine articles 3, 9, and 10:
28. The Committee on the Rights of the Child has interpreted articles 9 and 10 as
together recognizing a right of children not to have their parents deported. In 1995,
the Committee expressed its regret that “refugee or immigrant children born in
Canada may be separated from their parents facing a deportation order.” The Com-
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mittee also urged that “Solutions should also be sought to avoid expulsions causing
the separation of families, in the spirit of article 9 ol the Convention.”85
Wien paragraph 28 of the CCPI factum refers to articles 9 and 10 “inter
preted together,” CCPI is in effect saying that the putative implied right lies
neither entirely within article 9 nor entirely within article 10. The implied
right is justified by viewing the two rights as a mini-system. Put another way,
the CRC is looked at as a system whose purposes and textual signals allow for
interstitial interpretation such that there should be recognized an implied
right between article 9 and article 10 —an “article 9’/fc,” as it were.
This CRC interpretive example helps make clear how viewing the six
treaties as an evoking constitutional whole and the committees as chambers
of an integrated institution could produce a much richer tapestry of rights
than is possible if each treaty is looked at on its own and if each committee
goes about its work in isolation from the others. This is especially the case
when we consider the argument that we should constantly draw on the
fundamental interests that human rights are meant to protect and thereby
engage in interpretation that is more holistic and purposive as opposed to
categorical and (unduly) text-bound.86 Not only would interpretation of the
spaces between rights within a given treaty (as between articles 9 and 10 of
the CRC) be conducted in light of the normative cocoon provided by the
other five treaties but also we could begin to talk about implied rights in the
interstitial zones between treaties themselves.

Human Rights on the Diagonal: Between Drittwirkung
Responsibility

and Indirect

“Diagonality” (see Figure 3) attempts to capture the idea of (both concep
tual and institutional) joinder of the state and relevant private actors in
human rights scrutiny.87 Diagonality looks at human rights in terms of fields
of responsibility and power relations that engage the conduct (both acts
and omissions) of state and nonstate sectors simultaneously, and then links
that analysis to appropriate allocation of both legal responsibility and cre
ative (including joint) remedies. Diagonality analysis oilers possibilities for
rights-based scrutiny that are more structural and comprehensive than is
possible according to a stark either/or division of the applicability of rights
into the categories “horizontal” versus “vertical.” Rights relations are verti
cal if they involve the obligation of a governing actor (notably the state) to
ward nonstate actors and horizontal if they involve the claim that rights are
applicable in the “private” sector relations between nonstate actors (an axis
of applicability which German legal theory has labeled as drittwirkung)
It may be a long time before the committees are recognized as having the
implied power to directly scrutinize the activities of private actors given
the very state-centered (vertical) orientation of the human rights treaty
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Figure 3. Diagonality vectors representing possible appor
tionment of shared legal responsibility between public and
private actors.

regimes. However, it is a given that the indirect responsibility of states places
increasingly onerous obligations on them to regulate the private sector,
especially corporate activity given the concentration of power and potential
for harm represented by many companies.89 Within the analysis of the indi
rect responsibility of states parties to the treaties, it may become desirable
for the committees to request that states provide detailed information on
die conduct of all companies in given sectors or even on specified corpora
tions—and perhaps even request that states require companies themselves
to prepare reports on conduct which affects some or all of the treaty norms.
Without actuallyjoining the nonstate actors (for want of the formal jurisdic
tional nexus on which to do so), the committees could still “notionally” join
those actors so as to be able to assess the remedial measures they should
recommend to states, including the measures they recommend states take
vis-a-vis corporations. In a range of situations, the committees could inter
pret die indirect responsibility of the state to be engaged if it does not
regulate certain nonstate actors, notably corporations, in such a way as to
place those actors under direct obligations in domestic law to protect cer
tain human rights. With time, one could even foresee the committees en
couraging the voluntary appearance of some nonstate actors before the
committees in order to enhance the diagonality analysis.
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The notion of diagonality may not itself provide a strong reason for insti
tutional interaction among the committees. Rather, it seems only to piggy
back on the other reasons for integration already canvassed. However, diag
onality analysis would seem more achievable in a situation of institutional
integration than in one of institutional isolation. The polycentricity quo
tient of human rights analysis can be expected to go up in diagonality situa
tions where the competing or complementary rights and duties of different
persons are being openly addressed. For example, if diagonality analysis un
der the CRC were to suggest that all schools should be responsible for pre
venting or repairing certain harms to children (whether or not the schools
are state, private, or hybrid), then certain rights of parents, as found for
example in the ICESCR or the ICCPR, become relevant to the analysis.
Further, if there are reasons to think that placing certain kinds of financially
onerous duties on schools will disproportionately affect specific groups such
as residentially clustered racial minorities or single mothers, then CERJD
and CEDAW must be brought into the foreground of the picture.
Another example is brought to mind by the discussion of child support
obligations under article 27 of the CRC in Martha Shaffer’s contribution to
this volume (see Chapter 7). For ease of reference, the relevant portions of
article 27 are reproduced below:

1. States Parties recognize the right of every child to a standard of living adequate for
the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development.
2. The parent(s) or others responsible for the child have the primary responsibility
to secure, within their abilities and financial capacities, die conditions of living
necessary for the child’s development.
3. States Parties, in accordance with national conditions and within their means,
shall take appropriate measures to assist parents and others responsible for the child
to implement this right and shall in case of need provide material assistance and
support programmes, particularly with regard to nutrition, clothing and housing.
4. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to secure the recovery of mainte
nance for the child from the parents or other persons having financial responsibility
for the child, both within the State Party and from abroad....
Article 27 is one of the rare examples of diagonality found on the surface of
a treaty text. While article 27(2) places a “primary responsibility” on par
ents to secure “the conditions of living necessary for the child’s develop
ment,” the state has, by article 27(3), general residual duties (a) to assist
parents in ensuring an adequate standard of living for their children and
(b) to carry out a classic “social and economic rights” function by “in the
case of need[] provid [ing] material assistance and support programmes,
particularly with regard to nutrition, clothing and housing.”
Of interest in the present example is the relationship between this latter
duty and the quite specific recovery duty in the first sentence of article
27(4). Shaffer’s coverage of the situation in Ontario reveals that this Cana
dian province appears to have done much on the side of horizontal respon-
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sibility for child support. Not only are a range of adult actors caught by
duties to provide child maintenance but also a special enforcement unit has
been formed to step in to force a delinquent (separated or divorced) parent
to pay court-ordered support payments. Especially as the bulk of persons
seeking to enforce support obligations for the care of their children are
women, this recent law reform can be viewed as simultaneously combining
gains in children’s rights and in women’s rights.
However, assume as a hypothetical that the Ontario regime does not
address, qua child support regime, the transitional period between the
default on the support payments and their eventual recovery by the state’s
enforcement unit. In that period, the custodial parent may have to turn to
social assistance. Now assume that the custodial parent may, in some bureau
cratic twist, have trouble being accepted as eligible for social assistance until
she proves that she has done all she can do to recover the money from the
defaulting former spouse. This problem would be easily rectifiable by re
quiring the state to issue a certificate that would attest to the fact that the
state has taken carriage of the recovery efforts and which would be recog
nized by social assistance authorities; a seamlessness would thereby be cre
ated between the child support regime and the safety net of the social
assistance regime.
Yet, assume a second problem that cannot so easily disappear through
better public/private documentation coordination, namely, that the social
assistance rate is likely to be a lesser rate than the support award. The
existence of such a disparity in income would suggest that the state, on these
assumed facts, has gone too far toward die horizontal end of the field of
responsibility. Both gender and child-centered diagonality analyses suggest
that a state must, in the transitional period, assume responsibility to con
tinue the support payments rather than leave the shortfall and add to the
burden on the mother (by virtue of having to try to access a separate state
bureaucracy each and every time the separated or divorced spouse defaults
on child support payments). That is to say, in these circumstances, it is the
last clause of article 27 (3) that should indicate the necessary axis of respon
sibility. The state’s duty to fulfill, as a secondary duty within article 27’s
structure, kicks in. The state may of course recover the amount paid for the
transitional period from the defaulting spouse, but it should not be able to
use that spouse’s primary responsibility as an excuse to avoid its own duty to
provide material assistance and support directly “in the case of need.”90
Furthermore, it takes little effort to see how the effects of a transitional gap
are exacerbated to the extent that the state has also adopted policies of
privatized responsibility across the range of governmental spheres, includ
ing by maintaining social assistance rates at levels that independently violate
the duty to avoid and eliminate child poverty. The CESCR’s scrutiny of the
general (in)adequacy of the state support for economically disadvantaged
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children and families would thus be a needed third point in a triangle of
scrutiny that the CRC, CEDAW, and CESCR could collectively carry out.

Indirect Extraterritorial Responsibility
Indirect state responsibility has been touched upon above, and mention has
been made of the special need for regulation of corporate activity in the
name of human rights. As economic globalization spreads and deepens, the
time is already upon us when the committees should be considering diago
nality across borders. The problematic activity especially of overseas oil and
mining companies has become a matter of general knowledge and concern^
in recent years; for example, the conduct of Unocal in Burma and Texaco in
Ecuador has resulted in human rights tort litigation in die courts of the
United States.91 The question is: How far should the UN human rights
system move toward positive duties on home states of corporations to pro
tect persons in other states from harms caused either by transnational enter
prises (TNEs) or by TNEs in association with the foreign state? Here “home
state” is used" broadly to cover slates in which companies are incorporated or
otherwise have a meaningful presence, such as being the site of the head
office or regional decision-making office.
Immediately, of course, the issue of extraterritoriality comes up. It is one
thing to hold a state responsible for human rights harm that its own agents
cause abroad.92 Many would view it as quite another thing to extend respon
sibility to states for failing to regulate private actors that cause the harm.
This is not the occasion to take a position on the larger issues involved in
placing indirect extraterritorial responsibility on states other than to say
that at minimum some state responsibility (however it ends up being appor
tioned between home states and host states) is, as an empirical matter, nec
essary if transnational corporate conduct is not to continue to fall between
the normative cracks of globalization. One area in which there already
seems to be emergent consensus on home state responsibility to regulate
activity of nationals abroad in the name of human rights is with respect to
child sex tourism. While most responses, in countries like Australia and
Canada, have been to criminalize the individual conduct of the (ab) users of
child prostitutes, it is arguably inadequate if those countries do not also
regulate the commercial, and consequent mass-tourism, dimension of travel
for sex with children by making it contrary to the law for travel agencies,
airlines, and others knowingly to facilitate such tourism. When a leading
international lawyer based in a sovereignty-sensitive country like Singapore
goes on record as arguing for such extended extraterritorial responsibility,
there is good reason to believe that transnational regulation of child sex
tourism may well prove to be the Trojan horse for a new paradigm of extra
territorial human rights responsibility.93
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Take the norm of nondiscrimination as a further example. This is a norm
that the human rights treaty bodies have long made clear places positive
duties on states with respect to private sector discrimination within their
own states.94 Thus, for example, a country like Japan is under treaty obliga
tions to regulate sex discrimination in private workplaces. Assume the fol
lowing seemingly fanciful facts.95 Mitsubishi Corporation, a Japanese com
pany, places advertisements in Japanese newspapers that seek to market
Mitsubishi’s heavy duty air conditioners by using a double entendre on the
idea of “air service.” The ads feature a Japanese Airlines (JAL) pilot who is
asked an ambiguous question about whether he slept in a room with air
conditioning or with one of the (female) JAL cabin crew. The union for JAL
pilots launch a protest campaign that includes writing to Mitsubishi to com
plain that the ad “stereotyped and denigrated the cabin crew profession.”96
After the company dismissed the complaint out of hand, the union ap
proached the Japanese prime minister’s office and thus placed the issue on
the political agenda. No formal action was taken but, within two weeks,
Mitsubishi had agreed to retract the discriminatory ad and to issue a formal
'pology that was published in full-page ads in fourJapanese newspapers and
so aired via the broadcast media.
What if neither Mitsubishi nor Japan had acted in response to the comUaints and, furthermore, what if there existed no legislative avenue for
the JAL employees to seek legal redress for discriminatory treatment by
their employer? The nondiscrimination jurisprudence of the Human Rights
Committee and of the CESCR (where workplace discrimination is even
more central to the treaty’s mandate) would clearly be applicable, and
Japan’s duty to permit freedom of (corporate) expression would be squarely
up against the right of female employees not to be discriminated against.
Now, assume —crucially for this example —that the above-described events
occurred in Thailand, not Japan. The Mitsubishi ad used Thai Airways em
ployees, not Japan Airlines employees; the ads were placed in Thai not
Japanese newspapers; and it was the Thai Prime Minister's office that became
involved. These three modifications align the example with the facts.97 As
such, the fictionalized situation (all material facts taking place in Japan) is
transformed into a situation of extraterritorial responsibility of Japan for
Japanese corporate conduct abroad. In asking whether the treaty nondis
crimination norms should requirejapan to regulate Mitsubishi’s conduct in
Thailand no differently than its conduct in Japan, the analysis would clearly
benefit from the interactive insights of a number of the committees both on
the desirable content of the nondiscrimination norm and on the larger
international law question of the extraterritorial scope of human rights
treaties. Not only would CEDAW, the HRC, and the CESCR have direct
contributions to make, but so also would CERD for whom the central ques
tion would be whether Mitsubishi had racialized the Thai women (especially
were it to turn out that no such ads run in Japan or that the ads that run in
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Japan also use Thai employees and not Japanese employees). Quite beyond
the substantive benefits of institutional interaction among the committees,
any decision to move toward a paradigm of indirect extraterritorial respon
sibility for transnational corporate conduct would have its authority en
hanced significantly if it could be presented as a decision taken by all six
committees in their shared perception that they should promote the evolu
tion of a global constitutional order centered on the UN human rights
treaties rather than as a decision of one or two committees who could be
condemned by states as acting outside their mandate.

Global Constitutional Monitoring: Accountability of
Interstate Governing Institutions and Regimes
The preceding section ended by broaching the subject of global constitu
tionalism, but global constitutionalism in the context of the world’s evolving
political economy cannot rest content with a focus only on apportioning
state responsibility and on seeking to develop some indirect monitoring of
transnational corporate conduct. All governing actors and all governance regimes
within the global(izing) order must also eventually be accounted for in the
evolution of the normative functions and authority of the UN human rights
committees. Much concern is already being directed in contemporary so
cial and political discourse to the problems of (lack of) human rights ac
countability of international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the Inter
national Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, for the devastating
consequences of recent UN Security Council activity notably in respect of
sanctions regimes such as that maintained on Iraq, and on the lack of a
human rights counterbalance to the rapidly solidifying hegemony of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) regime. To date, the human rights treaty
bodies cannot be said to have more than hinted at how they conceptualize
their authority to monitor these interstate institutions and regimes.98
But it is safe to say, I think, that both ideas and intercommittee solidarity
must begin to be generated through a collective articulation of a legal the
ory of governance responsibility (as contrasted to the traditional, and ongoing,
focus on “state responsibility”) according to which states are no more per
mitted to escape human rights accountability by configuring governance
through delegation to the interstate level than they should be allowed to
shed human rights through delegation by privatization." Given that inter
national organizations and treaty regimes generally retain, at the formal
juridical level, their state-centeredness, there should —ultimately —be little
doubt about the legitimacy of the human rights committees beginning to
address state conduct that takes interstate forms. At minimum, normative
pronouncements on human rights violations committed by, for example,
the IMF or the Security Council can be presented as preconditions to con
clusions about die state responsibility of the states that are members and
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decision makers in those institutions. A capacity to focus on global struc
tures and on the human rights obligations of multiple actors represents a
possible constitutional future for the UN human rights treaty system, a
future that will only be possible if the current fragmented treaty order
comes increasingly to be recognized as an integrated (normative and in
stitutional) whole. The trick will be for the UN human rights treaty order to
finesse its own state-centered formal foundations as it moves toward this new
state of affairs.
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Chapter 1. Toward the Institutional Integration of
the CoreHuman Rights Treaties

The author would like to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council of Canada for its generous financial support.
1. The six treaties and committees are (1) the Convention on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women (“the Women’s Discrimination Convention”) and
Committee (CEDAW); (2) the Convention on the Rights of the Child (“Children’s
Convention”) and Committee (CRC); (3) the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (“Racial Discrimination Convention”) and Commit
tee (CERD); (4) the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or De
grading Treatment or Punishment (“Torture Convention”) and Committee (CAT);
(5) the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
and Committee (CESCR); and (6) the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) and the Human Rights Committee (HRC).
2. See Craig Scott, “Reaching Beyond (Without Abandoning) the Category of
‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’,” Human Rights Quarterly 21 (1999): 633-700;
and Craig Scott, “Bodies of Knowledge: A Diversity Promotion Role for die UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights” in The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitor
ing, ed. Philip Alston and James Crawford (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2000), 403.
3. See die illustration used of migrant workers’ housing under the European
Social Charter where it is argued that the holistic jurisprudence of the Committee of
Independent Experts (now the European Committee of Social Rights) would be far

214

Notes to Pages 8-13

from assured within the UN treaty order due to the categorical separation of the
treaties, Scott, “Reaching Beyond,” 658-59.
4. Scott, “Bodies of Knowledge,” Section B, “Valuing Diversity of Knowledge,”
406-11. It is important to acknowledge that expertise and experience are overlap
ping forms of knowledge. This point will not be developed in the present chapter
other than simply to note that informal experience can be said to generate a type of
expertise while formal expertise is often incomplete or underdeveloped without
experience of the world or issues being studied.
5. Ibid., 406.
6. The reference to each treaty “having” a partial picture refers not to a limited,
category-bound focus tTiat is inherent in the treaty’s terms, but to a focus that is a
contingent (albeit inevitable) buildup of a body of doctrinal knowledge and associ
ated community of understandings within each treaty order.
7. It will be noted that die term “human rights committees” is used interchange
ably with reference to human rights “treaty bodies.”
8. See, for example, Report of the Secretary-General, Follow-Up Action on the Conclu
sions and Recommendations ofthe Sixth Meeting ofPersons Chairing the Human Rights Treaty
Bodies, UN Doc. HRI/MC/1996/2 (15 August 1996), para. 69, reporting CEDAW’s
request for a formal analysis by the human rights secretariat of how other treaty
bodies gel information from NGOs. [hereinafter 1996 Follow-up Report].
9. Fora leading study on this theme, see Michael C. Dorf and Charles F. Sabel, “A Con
stitution of Democratic Experimentalism,” Columbia Law Review 9S (1998): 267-473.
10. Mara Bustelo, “The Committee on die Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women at the Crossroads" in Alston and Crawford, Future of Human Rights Treaty
Monitoring, 99. CEDAW is serviced by a different secretariat from the other five
committees, the Division for die Advancement of Women, which operates out of the
UN’s New York location. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights (Office of the UNHCHR) services the rest of die five committees and oper
ates out of the UN’s Geneva location. This state of affairs has meant that CEDAW’s
interaction with the other committees, both formal and informal, has been im
peded. Since 1992 CEDAW has requested tiiat it be located in Geneva with the other
committees and serviced thereby by the Centre. Ibid., 83. In 1996 the UN Secretary
General informed the committee diat the 1996-97 program budget did not accom
modate the request. In their 1996 meeting, the chairpersons reaffirmed their sup
port for CEDAW’s request and expressed regret that the request had not been
respected, adding that “They share the Committee’s view that the Committee can
not function properly if its secretariat is physically separated from the secretariat of
all die other human rights treaty bodies.” Report of the Seventh Meeting of Persons
Chairing the Human Rights Treaty Bodies, UN Doc. A/51 /482 (11 October 1996), para.
46 [hereinafter Chairpersons’ Report, 7th Meeting, 1996, and similarly for other
such reports].
11. At the 1995 meeting the General Assembly authorized finances to fund die
annual meetings. Chairpersons’ Report, 6th Meeting, 1995, UN Doc. A/50/505
(4 October 1995), para. 3.
12. The High Commissioner for Human Rights, state delegations, representatives
of a number of UN specialized agencies, the chairperson of the Commission on
Human Rights rapporteurs, and so on.
13. On the first occasion when such oral interventions were permitted, 11 NGOs,
including Amnesty International, Defense for Children International, Women’s
International League for Peace and Freedom, Anti-Racism Information Service
(ARIS), and Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, are listed as having made pre
sentations. Chairpersons’ Report, 8th Meeting, 1997, UN Doc. A/52/507 (21 Octo-
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ber 1997), para. 10. At the chairpersons’ tenth meeting, the second of 1998,55 states
sent representatives. Chairpersons’ Report, 10th Meeting, 1998, UN Doc. A/53/432
(25 September 1998), para. 11.
14. For example, the Chairpersons’ Report, 6th Meeting, 1995, recommends that
die committees “take increased cognizance of the related activities of regional hu
man rights mechanisms” (para. 24) and “increase their cooperation and exchange
with United Nations non-conventional human rights bodies and mechanisms"
(para. 25). The Chairpersons’ Report, 8th Meeting, 1997, recommended that com
mittee members should refrain from participating in consideration of reports from
dieir own states (para. 29), which should make requests for assistance from spe
cialized agencies and other UN bodies more precise (para. 51).
15. Two of the more interesting ones were made at the seventh and eighdi meet
ings. In 1996, the chairpersons “recommend that the Centre for Human Rights
[now the Office of the UNHCHR] engage in an active dialogue with Bretton Woods
institutions so that in reference to human rights standards by these institutions, the
applicable United Nations human rights instruments will be given a preeminent
role.” Chairpersons’ Report, 7th Meeting, 1996, para. 56. Because these institutions
are normative outlaws in the sense that they are not subject to any direct review by
the committees, despite their interstate membership, it would appear that die com
mittees are interested in developing some kind of nascent accountability and see
bureaucrat-to-bureaucrat engagement as a possible place to start. In 1997 the chair
persons sought a “report . . . from the Legal Counsel [of the UN] which would
explore the feasibility of devising more innovative approaches in dealing with future
and existing amendments to the human rights treaties.” Chairpersons’ Report, 8th
Meeting, 1997.
16. In the most recent meetings, tlie chairpersons have begun to request the
secretariat to play a coordinating role with respect to both the information-sharing
and recommendation functions. For instance, in 1997 the chairpersons asked that a
succinct “activities profile” be prepared on each committee which would cover
die period preceding each future chairpersons’ meeting and that, starting with
die ninth meeting in 1998, the chairpersons be provided with a chart showing die
follow-up action that had been taken (by the committees and other actors to whom
recommendations may be addressed) “in response to each of die specific recom
mendations” contained in the chairpersons’ report from the preceding meeting.
Chairpersons’ Report, 8tli Meeting, 1997, paras. 72-74.
17. In 1995 the chairpersons “both welcome and endorse” General Comment 24.”
Chairpersons’ Report, 6th Meeting, 1995, para. 17.
18. By 1998 the controversy over General Comment 24 had drawn the Interna
tional Law Commission (ILC) into the fray. With Alain Pellet as commission special
rapporteur, the ILC continues its study on reservations to treaties. In implicit re
sponse to the Human Rights Committee, die ILC produced a document called
“Preliminary Conclusions of the International Law Commission on Reservations to
Normative Multilateral Treaties Including Human Rights Treaties.” Official Records of
the General Assembly, Fifty-Second Session Supplement No. 10 (A/52/10), paras. 125-27.
In turn, the chairpersons in 1998 objected to certain features of the ILC's approach,
saying, inter alia: “The chairpersons ... considered, however, dial the [ILC Prelimi
nary Conclusions] draft was unduly restrictive in [some] respects and did not accord
sufficient attention to the fact that human rights treaties, by virtue of their subject
matter and the role they recognize to individuals, could not be placed on precisely
the same footing as other treaties with different characteristics.... They requested
their Chairperson [i.e., the chairperson of the chairpersons, who is elected annually
by the chairpersons at the start of their meeting] to address a letter to the Interna-
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tional Law Commission on their behalf to reiterate their support for the approach
reflected in General Comment No. 24, and to urge that the conclusions proposed by
the International Law Commission be adjusted accordingly.” Chairpersons’ Report,
9th Meeting, 1998, UN Doc. A/53/125 (14 May 1998), paras. 17 and 18. Later in
1998, at its second meeting that year, the chairpersons drew attention again to their
position on the special nature of human rights treaties. Chairpersons’ Report, 10th
Meeting, 1998, para. 51.
19. The 1996 Follow-up Report, para. 18 (reporting on the fifth meeting of the
chairpersons).
20. Ibid., para. 20. And see Andrew Byrnes, ‘‘Uses and Abuses of the Treaty Report
ing Procedure: Hong Kong Between Two Systems” in Alston and Crawford, Future of
Human Rights Treaty Monitoring, 287, 296.
21. “[A] careful review of all the relevant materials provided no basis upon which
to conclude that the States parties to the Covenant intended to permit its unilateral
denunciation by a state party. Moreover, the right to make such a denunciation
would not seem to be compatible with the nature of the Covenant. The chairpersons
therefore called upon all members of the international community to do everything
possible to uphold the integrity of the human rights treaty system in general, and
that of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in particular.” Chair
persons’ Report, 8th Meeting, 1997, para. 29.
22. General comment on issues relating to the continuity of obligations to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.
1 /Add. 8 (29 October 1997).
23. Chairpersons’ Report, 9th Meeting, 1998, para. 25.
24.Ibid.
25. ‘‘The chairpersons considered that there was a very strong basis, in both law and
policy, to support the consideration of a situation in the absence of a report, once
repealed requests had failed to persuade a state to honor its treaty obligation to
report.” Ibid, (emphasis added). While this passage may, to some, suggest something
just short of a firm collective conclusion, the chairpersons conclude their analysis,
three paragraphs later, with a consensus in favor of the approach, stated as follows:
“As a final resort, . . . committees should be willing to consider proceeding with a
consideration of the situation, on the basis of information provided by the State
Party and taking account of all other relevant information.” Ibid., para. 28.
26. Ibid., para. 27.
27. Chairpersons’ Report, 6th Meeting, 1995, para. 34. See also paras. 31,35. The
expert group met in 1995 as a follow-up to the Vienna Declaration and Program of
Action. Five other recommendations of the expert group were also endorsed by the
Chairpersons (ibid., para. 34) and all six were reiterated verbatim in 1996. Chairper
sons’ Report, 7th Meeting, 1996, para. 58.
28. As canvassed in the 1996 Follow-up Report, paras. 100-108.
29. Ibid., para. 103 (CHR Resolution 1996/22).
30. Ibid., paras. 106-8.
31. Ibid., para. 105.
32. Ibid., para. 101. This followed from a recommendation of the Commission on
the Status of Women and consultations between the division and the secretariat for
the five other treaty bodies, at the time the Centre for Human Rights. Ibid. It seems
that the division also consulted with members of one committee, the HRC, ibid. Al
the tenth meeting of the chairpersons a background paper on gender integration in
the work of all six committees, prepared by the Division for die Advancement of
Women, was circulated (UN Doc. HRI/MC/1998/16). Chairpersons’ Report, 10th
Meeting, 1998, para. 13.
33. Report of the Secretary-General, Improving the Effectiveness of the Human Rights
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Treaty Bodies, UN Doc. HRI/MC/1997/2 (29July 1997), para. 38 [hereinafter 1997
Follow-up Report].
34. Chairpersons’ Report, 8th Meeting, 1997, para. 63. Whether simply one more
(coincidental) sign of UN systemwide attention to gender equality or a partial re
sponse to the chairpersons’ invitation, the UN Division for the Advancement of
Women (the CEDAW secretariat) organized a workshop on human rights and gen
der equality in late 1998 that brought together members of the UN Inter-agency
Committee on Women and Gender Equality and of the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/
DAC) Working Party on Gender Equality. For its Report of a Workshop held 5-7
October 1998, FAO Headquarters, Rome, Italy, see A Rights-Based Approach to Women's
Empowerment and Advancement and Gender Equality (New York: UN Division for the
Advancement of Women, 1998).
35. Chairpersons’ Report, 8th Meeting, 1997, para. 64.
36. Not unrelated is another recommendation on a pan-treaty, cross-cutting issue
found two paragraphs later: “The chairpersons recommended that each treaty body
give careful attention to the measures which it might take in relation to the relevant
human rights aspects of HIV/AIDS.” Ibid., para. 66. One further example of the
chairpersons identifying a common normative issue that all six committees should
address is the recommendation in 1995 that “each treaty body, in its examination of
state party reports, investigate compliance by states parties with the extensive obliga
tions regarding education and the provision of public information on human rights
in general.’’ Chairpersons’ Report, 6th Meeting, 1995, para. 20. Not only is this
another example of a normative issue spanning the six-treaty order but also it is a
good example of the interdependent nature of the various cross-cutting sectors so
far addressed by die chairpersons, as education and information are key compo
nents of advancing gender equality, health, and HIV/AIDS prevention. The most
recent initiative in this cluster of cross-cutting issues, again with gender integration a
central aspect, is a recent “joint statement” on die indivisibility of human rights: see
discussion below.
37. Chairpersons’ Report, 6th Meeting, 1995, para. 36.
38. Chairpersons’ Report, 8th Meeting, 1997, paras. 23, 24.
39. Later in the same report, the chairpersons said simply but quite emphatically:
“The general view of the chairpersons was that it was neither practicable nor desir
able to envisage joining the six human rights bodies into a single committee.” Ibid.,
para. 38.
40. This suggestion grew out of dissatisfaction of the committees with not having
been appropriately involved in either the preparation or the formal negotiations of
the various recent world conferences in the human rights fields. Chairpersons’ Re
port, 6th Meeting, 1995, para. 22. UN legal counsel issued a legal opinion that does
little to help give the committees (each alone or as a group) some kind of internal
UN personality that would allow a more active engagement with the rest of the UN.
The legal counsel, with respect to committee representation at conferences, stated
the standard position that it is up to states to decide who to invite to such conferences
and that, once invited, nonstate entities can have observer status. 1996 Follow-up
Report, paras. 59, 60. In response, the chairpersons reiterated their call for a more
official “distinct status that would enable them [the committees] to participate in all
relevant meetings.” Chairpersons’ Report, 7th Meeting, 1996, para. 34. They specifi
cally requested the UN General Assembly to adopt a resolution that in effect would
constitute the desired status at least in terms of creating presumptive rights for each
treaty body to participate in meetings of interest to them.
41. Thus, for example, a treaty body council could seek to build on the participa
tion of both the CESCR and the CRC in an expert group on the right to housing that
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was preparatory to die Habitat II conference. Although not formally acting as a
treaty-body mission, theirjoint presence at least ensured that the generalist perspec
tive of the ICESCR and the specific focus of the CRC were brought to bear at that
world conference. A consolidated treaty-body perspective could well have been en
hanced if die other treaty bodies had also sent members.
42. See especially Robin Lakoff, Language and Woman’s Place (1975; New York:
HarperTorchbooks, 1989), and Robin Tolmach Lakoff, Talking Power: The Politics of
Language (New York: Basic Books, 1990).
43. For example, insiders in the Council of Europe’s human lights apparatus are
convinced that the transfer of support services for die European Social Charter from
die Social Affairs Directorate to die Human Rights Directorate had an important
constitutive effect on both enhancing the status of the charter and pluralizing under
standings of “human rights.” See Craig Scott and Patrick Macklem, “Constitutional
Ropes of Sand or Justiciable Guarantees? Social Rights in a Future South African
Constitution” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 141 (1992): 40, n. 117.
44. Parenthetically, there is also reason to be concerned about the institutional
appropriations in human rights discourse outside the immediate realm of the treaty
bodies. Most notably, it is very problematic if leading actors in the international
NGO movement are identified in the popular mind with “human rights,” but focus
almost exclusively in their own mandates only on a limited spectrum of rights. For
example, the exclusion of social and economic rights from most of the work of the
Human Rights Watch group has been notorious in this respect. As for Amnesty
International, it is perhaps die NGO most associated around the world with the
human rights movement. Al at least does not seek to cover the field with its organiza
tion’s name in the way the Human Rights Watch group has, but Al’s active focus only
on a subset of what we tend to categorize as “civil and political rights” does have a
covering-the-field effect on what rights quickly come to the popular mind when they
hear or see the term “human rights.” It must be said that Al’s educational campaigns
do focus on the whole spectrum of rights within die UDHR.
45. Given the very general phrasing of many of the rights in the ICCPR, it is
conceptually possible to imagine virtually all the other rights in the other treaties as
also being protected within the ICCPR. The point may come when die Human
Rights Committee acts sufficiendy on die principle of the interdependence of hu
man rights that it begins to earn its imperial title.
46. 1996 Follow-up Report, para. 103 (emphasis added).
47. It is also not an encouraging sign that certain members of the Human Rights
Committee have reacted with no small degree of pique and lack of grace to what they
see as the evolving jurisdictional encroachment of the chairpersons. To substantiate
the preceding sentence, some context must be set out in more detail than can be
justified in the present context. See Craig Scott, “Turf: An Eye Witness Account of
die Sovereign Sensitivities of the UN Human Rights Committee,” (www.scotditerary
.com/turf).
48. Philip Alston, Final Report on Enhancing the Long-Tenn Effectiveness of the United
Nations Human Rights Treaty System, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/74 (7 March 1997),
paras. 110, 14-35 (hereinafter 1997 Alston Report).
49. Philip Alston, Interim Report on Study on Enhancing the Long-Term Effectiveness of
the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Regime, UN Doc. A/CONF.157/PC/ 62/
Add.ll/Rev.l (22 April 1993) (hereinafter 1993 Alston Report).
50. Chairpersons’ Report, 10th Meeting, 1998, para. 26.
51. This brackets the parallel issue of a campaign for the removal of reservations.
This is not the occasion to elaborate, but one price that will likely need to be paid for
universal ratification will be a continuing tolerance for reservations. Thereafter the
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current campaign to encourage states to remove their reservations could be taken
up with full intensity.
52. Note that there would remain a denunciation problem. Only ICCPR, ICESCR,
and CEDAW have no clauses permitting denunciation. To date, no states have re
acted to the Chairpersons’ and the Human Rights Committee’s conclusions that
withdrawal is prohibited from the ICCPR (and, by direct implication, ICESCR and
CEDAW) by virtue of the absence of clauses specifically authorizing it: see discussion
above on the denunciation issue. However, even if there is general acceptance of this
no-denunciation interpretation for these three treaties, there would still remain
three treaties that expressly allow stales to withdraw from the treaty with requisite
notice: CAT, CRC, and CERD.
53. Pooling diversity across six committees is one way to compensate for diversity
deficits that result from ill-considered or random election results for any given com
mittee. For both an empirical and normative account of recent and current dis
parities in different committees, see Scott, “Bodies of Knowledge,” 411-22. Signifi
cantly, the chairpersons themselves have begun to cast a critical eye over problems of
composition within some of the committees. In 1997, they said: “The chairper
sons ... urged that consideration be given to the importance of expertise related to
die mandate of the treaty body, the need for balanced geographical composition ...
[and] ... the desirability of an appropriate gender balance.” Chairpersons’ Report,
8di Meeting, 1997, para. 68. A year later they said (twice): “The chairpersons ex
pressed strong concern at the geographical and gender imbalances reflected in the
composition of certain of the treaty bodies. In particular, they noted that the num
ber of African representatives widiin two of the committees was entirely unsatisfac
tory. They recognized that the election of members of the treaty bodies was entirely a
matter for the States parties. Neverdieless they called upon States parties to make a
concerted effort to remedy imbalances.” Chairpersons’ Report, 10th Meeting, 1998,
para. 16 and, in a very unusual act of reiteration, again verbatim at para. 55. When, in
the 1997 statement, the chairpersons used the phrase “appropriate . . . balance”
in respect of gender, it is likely the modifier “appropriate” was carefully chosen in
order not to prejudice die issue of whether the current composition of CEDAW (all
twenty-three members are women) remains an appropriate state of affairs in light of
die overall gender imbalance (in favor of men) across die other five committees and
in light of the fact recent inroads in integrating a “women’s rights” perspective into
UN human rights discourse are just tiiat recent and, as such, still tenuous in their
hold. On a brief allusion to how CEDAW’s composition fils widiin a theory of inter
active diversity of knowledge, see the conclusion in Scott, “Bodies of Knowledge,”
437. Broadly speaking, the argument for some judicious opening of CEDAW mem
bership to the election of some men who are experts in women’s rights issues will
grow more powerful (1) the more integrated the institutional arrangements linking
the six committees become, (2) the more gender perspectives become effectively
integrated in the normative analysis of the six-eommittee order (in large part as a
consequence of the institutional integration), and (3) the more the composition of
the other five committees consistently includes a critical mass of women experts.
54. In his 1993 report, Alston recommended such a single consolidated report.
1993 Alston Report, 50.
55.1997 Alston Report, paras. 91-93. The initial report of any state to a committee
would have to be comprehensive. It would be thereafter that the committees would
channel the focus.
56. Chairpersons’ Report, 10th Meeting, 1998, paras. 30, 31; Chairpersons’ Re
port, 9th Meeting, 1998, paras. 30; 34, 35.
57. Chairpersons’ Report, 10th meeting, 1998, paras. 30, 31.

220

Notes to Pages 21-25

58. As already indicated, 1993 Alston Report, 55, Alston was a proponent of a
consolidated report as early as his 1993 interim report, but he is aware of the con
cerns that consolidation can threaten diversity. On the parallel issue of the possible
undesirable effects of institutional consolidation (into a single committee), he noted
in his 1997 final report:
[M]any of the advantages [of consolidation] can equally well be portrayed as
disadvantages, and vice versa, depending on the assumptions and perspectives of
the observer.... It can be argued that the super-committee would, by virtue of its
extensive purview and probably almost permanent sessions, develop enormous
expertise. The counter-argument is that the variety of expertise represented on the existing
range of committees is greater than could ever be captured on a single committee. . . . Or, it
can be argued that a single committee would facilitate the effective integration of
different concerns such as racial and sex-based discrimination, children’s and
migrant workers’ rights, and economic, social and cultural rights. The counter
argument is that some of those concerns might simply be glossed over and that the supervisory
process would no longer serve to galvanize those sectors of the Government and of the
community dealing with, or interested in, a specific issue. (1997 Alston Final Report, 49,
para. 182; emphasis added)
59. Of course the ongoing refusal of the Secretary-General to move CEDAW to
Geneva means that any such coordination will be radically incomplete until such a
move takes place.
60. 1997 Follow-up Report, para. 17.
61. The Centre for Human Rights in its 1997 follow-up report to the 1996 chairper
sons’ meeting has suggested that, in view of the fact that “the equal enjoyment of
men and women of all human rights is an overarching principle of the six principal
human rights treaties,’’ the chairpersons may wish to “consider inviting an interested
organization to convene a round-table or expert meeting to assist with the drafting of
general comments on gender equality.” Ibid., para. 38.
62. Chairpersons’ Report, 10th Meeting, 1998, paras. 34, 36.
63. Chairpersons’ Report, 10th Meeting, 1998, para. 35.
64. Ibid.
65. See the suggestions of Committee members Wimer Zambrano, Jimenez Butragueno, and Texier in Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Sum
mary Record of the 45th Meeting, 19th Session, 26 November 1998, UN Doc.
E/C.12/1998/SR.45 (30 November 1998), paras. 1-11.
66. The consideration of the draft joint statement ended as follows:
10. The CHAIRPERSON said he took it that Committee members were in favour of
adopting the draft joint statement in principle, on the understanding that their
amendments and comments would be duly taken into account during consulta
tions between representatives of the three different Committees with a view to
drafting a final version.
11. It was so agreed.
CESCR, Summary Record, paras. 10-11. Note the term “representatives,” which
could be understood as allowing some members of each of the three committees to
participate, with their three Chairpersons, in the final consultations.
67. Compare the draft as it appears in the Summary Record, para. 1, and the final
joint statement that appears as a decision of the CESCR in the Committee’s report in
its eighteenth and nineteenth sessions: “Fiftieth Anniversary of the Universal Decla
ration on Human Rights: Joint Statement Adopted by the Committee on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women and the Human Rights Committee,” in Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, Report on the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Sessions (27 April15 May 1998, 16 November-4 December 1998), Economic and Social Council, Offi-
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cial Records, 1999, Supplement No. 2, UN Doc. E/C.12/1998/26 (New York and
Geneva: United Nations, 1999). The paragraph dial was added as a result of the
CESCR’s input into the draft was paragraph 8, which reads as follows: “Unfortu
nately, the principle of the indivisibility of all human rights and the equality of all
rights of men and women are still far from being reality: civil and political rights are
too often given precedence over economic, social and cultural rights and real equal
ity between men and women exists in no country.” By the lime of the CESCR’s
decision to adopt the joint statement, it had also been adopted by CEDAW. Bustelo,
“At die Crossroads,” 98. As of the end of May 2000, the Human Rights Committee
had yet to adopt any version of the joint statement. It appears that the committee has
discussed it officially only once. Human Rights Committee, Summary Record of the
Second Part (Public) of the 1699th Meeting of 31 July 1998, in UN Doc. CCPR/C/
SR.1699/Add.l. (Summary Record) (5 August 1999). Apart from the concerns
expressed by some members in the cited summary record (e.g., that the joint state
ment was loo focused on CEDAW, that other committees such as the CRC should
have been included, that some revisions were desirable, and that the HRC may not
have competence to sign onto joint statements), information from some committee
members was that “members” of the committee “showed great skepticism” on two
fronts: (1) “in relation to die quality” of the proposed joint statement; and, (2) more
generally, with regard to the “usefulness of a joint statement approach.”
68. Canada did in fact report in November 1998 to CESCR and in March 1999 to
die HRC. There is a remarkable overlap of normative concern in each committee’s
concluding observations, due in significant part to Canadian NGOs submitting coor
dinated representations to both committees. For discussion of these two sets of
concluding observations, including eight points of overlap, see Craig Scott, “Can
ada’s International Human Rights Obligations and Disadvantaged Members of So
ciety: Finally into the Spotlight?” Constitutional Forum 10 (1999): 97-111.
69. Common questions are not necessarily ideal. Diversity of perspective is perhaps
more likely to emerge and to provoke mutual education among committee members
across treaty boundaries if common questions are asked only where relatively easy'
consensus is achievable among all the committees on both the desirability and
the formulation of a proposed question. Achieving an optimal balance would be
the challenge. Commonality in areas of clear shared concern signals to stales an
authority based on solidarity of analysis, but it can also produce lowest-commondenominator phrasing that can fail to put the state on the spot to justify its conduct.
The time available for intercommillee preparation and coordination will affect the
balance. The more advance opportunity the committees have to collect and exam
ine questions proposed by all the committees with respect to a particular state, the
more likely it will be that each committee will be persuaded to sign on to a question
proposed by other committees despite the question not having occurred to any of
that committee’s members or despite die question not being viewed as much of a
priority by that committee.
70. For instance, where the first committee had inadequate opportunity to probe a
given issue; where a state’s representatives had pledged to provide a fuller response
after returning to their state and consulting with counterparts in government; and
where the state’s representatives had prevaricated or otherwise given unsatisfactory
answers to the first committee.
71. Whether states’ consent to such procedural innovations would be required
need not detain us here. As long as each committee exercises its own final judgment
on its concluding observations (even if that includes an agreement on common
conclusions with another committee), there would be no issue of inappropriate
exercise ofjurisdiction. However, if new approaches are to be tried experimentally,
in advance of general adoption of the procedure for all similarly placed states, it may
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well be prudent to secure an expression of willingness to participate in such experi
ments from the states in question.
72. See art. 17(2), CAT. Christine Chanet of France at one point served simulta
neously on the Human Rights Committee and CAT.
73. The words “AZZ that is required” should be read with a grain of salt, as the lack
of a central coordinating mechanism for elections to the treaty bodies make cooper
ation very difficult to achieve, even if the will to cooperate were there. See Scott,
‘‘Bodies of Knowledge,” 426-31, for a discussion of the collective action problems in
the voting practice with respect to the committees. Recall also the current imbal
ances elections have produced on the (geographical and gender) diversity fronts to
which the chairpersons have twice drawn attention.
74. See Georges Seelie, “Regies generales de la paix,” Collected Courses of the Hague
Academy of International Law 46, 1 (1933): 358-59, 421 -27.
75. Probably the now classic statement of these kinds of structuring-the-entirestate positive obligations was made by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
when it said that the duty to ensure human rights “implies the duty of all the States
Parties to organize the governmental apparatus and, in general, all the structures
through which public power is exercised, so that they are capable of juridically
ensuring the free and full enjoyment of human rights” Velasquez Rodriguez v. Hon
duras, 28 ILM 291 (1989), para. 166. The court went on to note: “The Stale has a
legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent human rights violations. ... This duty
to prevent includes all those means of a legal, political, administrative and cultural
nature that promote the safeguard of human rights and ensure that any violations
are considered and treated as illegal acts.” Ibid., paras. 174, 175.
76. Notice the use of “should.” It is not being assumed that the current CERD is
positioned to offer the necessary insights that would be useful for CAT or that the
current CAT would necessarily be receptive if those insights were available.
77. As can be seen, for example, from art. 13(1) of the ICESCR and art. 29(1) of
the CRC.
78. Recall the chairpersons’ recommendation on human rights education, Chair
persons’ Report, 6th Meeting, 1995.
79. On health and nutrition (especially as relates to infant mortality), see Human
Rights Committee, General Comment 6/16, Right to Life (Article 6), reprinted in
Manfred Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (Kehl
am Rhein/Strasbourg/Arlington: N.P. Engel, 1993), 851. On homelessness, includ
ing its implications for health, see Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observa
tions on Canada, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.lO5 (7 April 1999), para. 12.
80. Airey v. Ireland, 2 EHRR 305 (1979). For a discussion of the interpretive process
involved in the implication in the Airey case, see Scott, “Reaching Beyond,” 640-41.
81. Johnston v. Ireland, 8 EHRR 203 (1986).
82. See discussion of this approach to interpretation in Craig Scott and Philip
Alston, “Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational Context: A Com
ment on Soobramoney's Legacy and Grootboom's Promise” South African foumal of Hu
man Rights 16 (2000).
83. Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2 SCR 817 (1999).
84. Art. 3(1) reads: “In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by
public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities
or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”
It should be noted that the author acted as co-counsel for CCPI in Baker.
85. Factum, CCPI, in Baker v. Canada, accessible at (www.web.net/ccpi/baker/
factum.html). As co-counsel for CCPI in the Baker case I was closely involved in
drafting the factum.
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86. Scott, “Reaching Beyond,” 634-41.
87. This notion was first put forward in Craig Scott, “Social Rights: Towards A
Principled, Pragmaticjudicial Role,” ESR Review 1,4 (March 1999): 5-6. ESR Review
is a quarterly publication of the Community Law Centre (University of Western
Cape) and the Centre for Human Rights (University of Pretoria).
88. For the leading book length study in English, see Andrew Clapham, Human
Rights in the Private Sphere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). On German legal
theory, see Oliver Gerstenberg, “Private Law, Constitutionalism and the Limits of the
Judicial Role” in Torture as Tori: Comparative Perspectives on the Development of Trans
national Human Rights Litigation, ed. Craig Scott (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001).
89. On indirect state responsibility, Craig Scott, “Multinational Enterprises and
Emergent Jurisprudence on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” in
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook, 2nd ed., ed., Asbjorn Eide, Catarina
Krause, Allan Rosas, and Martin Scheinin (The Hague: Nijhoff, 2000), chapter 32.
90. The CRC’s guidelines for periodic reports are suggestive ofjust this synthesis.
With respect to Art. 27(4), the CRC alerts states as follows:
F. Recovery of maintenancefor the child Please indicate the measures adopted ... and
mechanisms of programmes developed to secure the recovery of maintenance for
the child from the parents or other persons having financial responsibility for the
child ... including in cases of separation and divorce. Information should also be
provided on:
Measures taken to ensure the maintenance of the child in cases where parents or other
persons having financial responsibility for the child evade the payment of such
maintenance.
Committee on the Rights of the Child, “General Guidelines Regarding the Form
and Content of Periodic Reports to be Submitted by States Parties Under Article 44,
Paragraph 1(b), of the Convention,” adopted by the CRC at its 343rd meeting
(thirteenth session) on 11 October 1996, as reproduced in Rachel Hodgkin and
Peter Newell, Implementation Handbook for the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(Geneva: UNICEF, 1998), 609 (emphasis added).
91. See, e.g., Aguinda v. Texaco, 850 F. Supp. 282 (South. Dist. N.Y., 1994); Sequihua
v. Texaco, 847 F. Supp. 61 (South. Dist. Tex., 1994); Doe I v. Unocal, 963 F. Supp. 880
(Cent. Dist. Cal., 1997); Doe I v. Unocal, 27 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (Cent. Dist. Cal., 1998).
92. See the Human Rights Committee view on the extraterritorial application of
the ICCPR in De Casariego v. Uruguay, Communication No. 56/1979 (1981), para.
10.1-10.3.
93. Muthu Sornarajah, “South East Asia and International Law —State Responsi
bility and Sex Tours in Asia,” SingaporeJournal of International and Comparative Law 1
(1997): 414 at 422.
94. For relevant general comments by the Human Rights Committee, see Human
Rights Committee, General Comment 4/3, Gender Equality', General Comment No.
17/35, Rights of the Child', and General Comment 18/37, Non-Discrimination, re
printed in Nowak, UN. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 850, 865, 868.
95. These facts are taken from a recent report. At this point in the narrative, some
of the actors have been modified but none of the material facts. See “Mitsubishi’s
Apology for Sexist Advert,” HF News 3 (1999): 12. TIT News is the journal of the
International Transport Workers’ Federation. The reason for the modifications will
be made apparent in die text.
96. Ibid.
97.Ibid.
98. On the human rights implications of states participating in unjustifiable sanc
tions regimes, see the recent rather oblique general comment on sanctions issued by
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the CESCR, Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, “The Relation
ship Between Economic Sanctions and Respect for Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights,” General Comment 8, UN Doc. E/C.12/1997/8 (5 December 1997).
As for the chairpersons, there has been some ineffectual grumbling along the
following lines:
21.... it was once again regretted [by the chairpersons] that no ... constructive
relationship had yet been established between the treaty bodies and some key
agencies, in particular the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The
chairpersons welcomed the statement of UNDP that it intended to increase its
cooperation with the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as a
first step towards greater involvement in the work of the treaty bodies as a whole.
Chairpersons’ Report, 10th Meeting, 1998, para. 21.
On the issue of the accountability of these institutions, recall the earlier-quoted
passage in which the chairpersons requested the UN human rights bureaucracy to
begin a “dialogue” with the Bretton Woods institutions and my suggestion as to the
very embryonic form of accountability that this recommendation might represent.
Chairpersons’ Report, 7th Meeting, 1996.
On the issue of human rights in the global trading order, the Chairpersons have
made a muted pitch for the UN human rights treaties and monitoring bodies to be
taken seriously as the normative locus for human rights accountability of trade law:
49. The chairpersons note that one of the items on the agenda for the Minis
terial Meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO), to be held in Singapore
in December 1996, concerns proposals to adopt a “social clause” which would link
respect for human rights (notably freedom of association, non-discrimination in
employment, and the elimination of exploitative child labour) to access to trade
opportunities. They note that whatever the respective merits of such proposals,
the system of treaty supervision in which the treaty bodies are engaged already
provides an important avenue for monitoring compliance with States [sic] obliga
tions in these and related areas and that a greater effort should be made to
strengthen these existing opportunities.
Chairpersons’ Report, 7th Meeting, 1996, para. 49.
99. For a leading statement that constitutional rights responsibilities cannot be
avoided by devolution to nonstate actors, see J. La Forest in Eldridge v. British Columbia
(Attorney General), 3 SCR 624 (1997), para. 40: “Governments should not be permit
ted to evade their [Canadian] Charter [of Rights and Freedoms] responsibilities by
implementing policy through the vehicle of private arrangements.”

Chapter 2. From Division to Integration
1. This was also recognized in 1941 in U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt’s “Four
Freedoms Speech.” Roosevelt called for four essential human freedoms: freedom of
speech and expression, freedom of every person to worship God in his own way,
freedom from want, and freedom from fear.
2. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, adopted
16 December 1966, entered into force 3January 1976, GA Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 UN
GAORSupp. (No. 16) at 49, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966).
3. Introduction to Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: A Textbook, ed. Asbjorn Eide,
Caterina Krause, and Allan Rosas (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), 29.
4. United Nations Charter, 26June 1945, Can. T.S. 1945 no. 7, art. 55.
5. Matthew C. R. Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights: A Perspective on Its Development (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 16-17.
6. GA Res. 217A (III) (1948), art. 22.

